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Abstract 
We consider a heterogeneous social interaction model where agents interact with peers within their 
own network but also interact with agents across other (non-peer) networks. To address potential 
endogeneity in the networks, we assume that each network has a central planner who makes strategic 
network decisions based on observable and unobservable characteristics of the peers in her charge. The 
model forms a simultaneous equation system that can be estimated by Quasi-Maximum Likelihood. We 
apply a restricted version of our model to data on National Basketball Association games, where agents 
are players, networks are individual teams organized by coaches, and competition is head-to-head. That 
is, at any time a player only interacts with two networks: their team and the opposing team. We find 
significant positive within-team peer-effects and both negative and positive opposing-team 
competitor-effects in NBA games. The former are interpretable as “team chemistries" which enhance 
the individual performances of players on the same team. The latter are interpretable as “team rivalries," 
which can either enhance or diminish the individual performance of opposing players. 
JEL No.:  C13, C31, D24
Keywords: Spatial Analysis, Peer Effects, Endogeneity, Machine Learning 
Authors: William C. Horrace, Department of Economics, Center for Policy Research, Syracuse 
University; Hyunseok Jung, Department of Economics, University of Arkansas; Shane Sanders, 
Department of Sports Management, Syracuse University 
1. Introduction
We consider a world with R interrelated networks where agents interact with peers within their own
network but also interact with non-peers from other networks, but in different ways. For example,
we can think of teams of individual agents that cooperate within their network but compete across
networks. Competition between two or more R&D alliances comes to mind. A given firm may cooperate
with an R&D ally to achieve an intellectual property discovery, but firms across alliances compete.
Airline alliances (e.g., SkyTeam, Star Alliance and OneWorld) cooperate within their networks but
compete across networks. In these examples, multiple networks or teams may simultaneously compete,
but in some instances, such as sports, team competition is head-to-head. In most cases, within-network
peer interaction is complementary, and cross-network interaction is competitive. However, our model
allows for the converse to be true. For example, in sports competition a team’s performance may be
worsened or enhanced when they face a better team. We restrict attention to models where an agent’s
single outcome (e.g., sales performance) is a function of the simultaneous outcomes of their peers and
competitors. In particular, we are not concerned with the case of Liu (2014) or Cohen-Cole et al.
(2017), where there is a single peer network (no competitors) with multiple outcome variables (e.g., a
single network where peers allocates effort to simultaneous outcomes, such as labor and leisure hours).
In these examples, social interaction decisions are likely to be guided by a central planner for each
network (e.g., a sales mananger), and the choices of the planner may induce what Manski (1993) calls
a correlated effect, where “individuals in the same group tend to behave similarly because they... face
similar institutional environments.” The usual solution to the correlated effects problem is to include
a network-level fixed or random effect in the model specification. However, if the planner selects the
network strategically and simultaneously with output (Olley and Pakes, 1996), then the network itself
may be endogenous. Following Horrace et al. (2016), we augment the outcome equation with a team
selection equation that models the decisions of the central planners’ network choices. We consider
both parametric (Lee, 1983) and semi-parametric (Dahl, 2002) approaches to the selection problem.
Horrace et al. (2016) consider a network production function where a manager selects workers into
a network to produce output, but they ignore cross-network competition. In this sense, our paper
generalizes their study. It should be noted that the conceptual foundations for selection correction
in this way can be traced to papers by Brock and Durlauf. Brock and Durlauf (2006) generalize the
multinomial-choice model with social interactions proposed in Brock and Durlauf (2002) and suggest
that multinomial control functions may be used for self-selection corrections.
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Social network interactions have been studied extensively.1 However, simultaneous cross-network
interactions remain unexplored. A few papers model simultaneous activity for a single, time-invariant
network, and are multivariate extensions of the single equation spatial auto-regressive model (Cliff
and Ord, 1973, 1981) to simultaneous outcomes. Some are for a cross-section of data, and others
are for panel data. For example, Kelejian and Prucha (2004) generalize the spatial auto-regressive
(SAR) model to a simultaneous system for cross-section. Baltagi and Deng (2015) extend the model
to panel data with random-effects, while Cohen-Cole et al. (2017) extend it to a simultaneous system
with fixed-effects. Yang and Lee (2017) study identification and Quasi-Maximum Likelihood (QML)
estimation of the model of Kelejian and Prucha (2004) for cross-section. Empirical examples of these
simultaneous models include the effect of regional networks on migration and housing prices (Jeanty
et al., 2010); on migration, employment and income (Gebremariam et al., 2011); on rents for studio,
one-bedroom and two-bedroom apartments (Baltagi and Bresson, 2011); on simultaneous fiscal policies
(Allers and Elhorst, 2011); among others.
All these simultaneous peer-effect models are clearly related, but none consider multiple peer net-
works that may be engaged in simultaneous competition around a single outcome variable, nor do they
attempt to model the actions of a manager. Our model does both and in certain cases could be ap-
plied to traditional panel data, where outcomes of peers and competitors are observed in every period.
Here, however, only the actions of the manager are observed in every period, and she controls which
peers will compete and be observed in any period to produce the outcome (e.g., sales). Therefore, our
networks are time-varying, the model is conceptualized for repeated cross-sections (not panel), and
asymptotic arguments are for large nr, the number of peers competing in network r = 1, ..., R, with
a fixed number of networks, R, following Yang and Lee (2017). Nonetheless, our networks vary over
time (t = 1, ..., T ), so large T helps with consistent QML estimation of peer-effects, as our simulations
show. Simulations also show that when the networks are small (nr = 5), bootstrap bias correction
improves finite sample performance of the estimator.
Team chemistry (a within-team peer-effect) receives substantial empirical attention as a factor
influencing performance in sports and business. Unfortunately, team chemistry is difficult to measure.2
McCaffery and Bickart (2013) estimate team chemistry as a function of biological synchrony among
players, while Kraus, Huang, and Keltner (2010) find evidence that early-season, on-court tactile
communication is a predictor of later-season success at both the individual and team levels. Horrace
1See Manski (1993), Moffitt (2001), Lee (2007a), and Bramoulle et al. (2009).
2See Schrage (2014) who describes it as the “new holy grail of performance analytics” in sport and business.
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et al. (2016) develop a network production function model that estimates within-team peer-effects
on player productivity in men’s college basketball, but without competitor-effects.3 Our research
contributes to this empirical literature on team chemistry by controlling for the play and strategy of
the opposing team, and may be conceptualized as a generalization of their model.
We apply a restricted version of our model (i.e., where competition is head-to-head) to the 2015-16
National Basketball Association (NBA) regular season to simultaneously estimate within-network and
cross-network peer-effects for all thirty teams in the league, a total of 30 × 30 heterogeneous effects.
We find within-team peer-effects that are statistically significant and positive in the NBA. These are
performance multipliers that enhance the individual performance of players on the same team and
may be interpreted as “team chemistries.” We also find both positive and negative opposing-team
competitor-effects. That is, the team chemistry of your opponents may either enhance or diminish the
individual performance of players on your team. These effects may be loosely interpreted as “team
rivalries.” We correct for managerial selectivity bias using both the semi-parametric Dahl (2002) and
parametric Lee (1983) approaches, and estimate the coach’s selection probabilities from a selection
equation in two ways: standard multinomial logit (MNL) and a random forest (RF) algorithm from
the machine-learning literature.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the econometric specifica-
tion and estimation approaches, and Section 3 provides a simulations study of the proposed estimator.
Section 4 presents the result of the empirical exercise, and Section 5 concludes.
2. Econometric Model and Estimation Strategy
2.1 Outcome Function
We begin with a general statement of the outcome function, but consider a restricted version in our
application. There are R networks (alliances, chains or teams), and each network, r = 1, ..., R contains
nr peers with N =
∑
r nr. Peers cooperate within their own network but compete with members of
the other networks around a common outcome. The outcome function for the rth network is:
yrt = λrrWrrtyrt+
∑
k 6=r
λrkWrktykt+X1rtβ1r + ιnrx
′
2rtβ2r +urt, r = 1, ..., R, t = 1, ..., T, (1)
where yrt is an nr × 1 outcome vector for the rth network, X1rt is an nr × p1 exogenous input matrix
3This may induce an omitted variable bias, so their peer-effects may not be ceteris paribus estimates of team chemistry.
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that varies over peers i = 1, .., nr and t (peer-level variability), ιnr is an nr × 1 vector of ones, x2rt is
an p2×1 exogenous input vector that varies over t only (network-level variability), and urr is an nr×1
disturbance vector. The Wrrr is an nr×nr weight matrix for interaction within the rth network, while
Wrkr for k = r is a nr ×nk matrix for the effect from the kth network to the rth network. We assume
the matrices have network structure and are row-normalized, so that λrr is the average within-network
peer-effect for the rth network, and λrk is the average cross-network competitor-effect for k = r to the
rth network. The terms β1r and β2r are vectors of input coefficients for the r
th network. The existing
literature assumes that λrk = 0 for k = r. We allow within-network and cross-network effects to be
positive or negative. We may also refer to Wrrt as the peer network and Wrkt as the competitor
network.4
Following Horrace et al. (2016), each network r has a manager, who populates her network with
peers in each period t, selecting nr peers from a larger group of peers at her disposal. Peers work
together within their networks and compete across networks to produce yrt.
5 The strategic decisions
of the managers have implications for the econometric model. First, we only observe the outcome yirt
(say) for peer i in period t, when he is selected into network r by his manager. As such our data are
not a panel per se and should be considered repeated cross-sections. This is an important distinction
between our model and other social network models for panel data, where each peer is observed in
each period and networks are often fixed over time (e.g., Lee and Yu, 2010, 2014). Indeed, lack of a
true panel is fundamental to the need for managerial selection correction.
Also, the simultaneous actions of the managers induce a network-level correlated effect (Manski,
1993). Without loss of generality we assume that all manager’s have the same number of workers at
their disposal, n0 > nr. Let dirt be an indicator variable such that dirt = 1, if worker i is assigned
to network r in period t, and dirt = 0, otherwise. Then all managerial decisions at time t can be
′
characterized by the n0 × R matrix Dt = (d1t, ...,dRt) with drt = (d1rt, ..., dnr0rt) . The correlated
effect then implies E(urt|Dt) = 0, and Dt is clearly correlated with all the variables and networks on
the right-hand side of (1). Ultimately, we use arguments from the game theory literature for static
games of incomplete information with multiple equilibria (i.e., Bajari et al., 2010) to model managerial
decisions and their effects on network peers and competitors, but for now we assume that the actions
6
6
6
6
4Additionally, one can include Wrrtxrt terms into the model to separately identify exogenous social effects from the
endogenous social effects. We follow Horrace et al. (2016) and do not include exogenous network effects in the outcome
function.
5There are other interpretations of the model. For example, we can think of t as representing distinct markets, where
networks (firms, teams) might compete, but not all networks may be present in each market. If any network r or k does
not compete in market t, then λrk = 0.
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of the managers affect all active peers in network r in the same way. Hence, the correlated effects
reduce to time-varying network fixed-effects. That is, E(urt|Dt) = ιnrαrt, where αrt is a scalar.
Let u∗
′
rt = urt − ιnrαrt. Also, let Xrt = [X1rt, ιnrx2rt] be a nr × p matrix with p = p1 + p2 and
′ ′ ′
βr = [β1r,β2r] , then the entire system at time t is,
∑R ∑R
yt = λrkGrktyt + Xtβ+ αt + u
∗
t , t = 1, ..., T, (2)
r=1 k=1
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′
where yt = (y1t, ...,yRt) , Xt = Diag(X
∗
t ..., Rt) , αt = (ιn1α
∗ ∗
1 , X rt, ..., ιnRαRt) , ut = (u1t, ...,uRt)
′ ′ ′
and β = (β1, ...,βR) . Grkt is an N ×N block matrix with R row blocks and R column blocks. The
blocks in Grkt are all blocks of zeros except for r
th row block in the kth column block position, which[ ] [ ]
equals Wrkt. For example, if there are R = 2 networks, then G
W11t 0
11t = , G22t =
0 0
0 0 0 W , G12t[ ] [ ] 22t
= 0 W12t , and G21t =
0 0
W21t 0 where 0 is a conformable matrix of zeros. We require the following0 0
regularity conditions.
Assumption 1. Let u∗ th ∗ ∗ 2irt be the i element of urt. The uirt are iid(0, σr) and a moment of order
higher than the fourth exists.
Assumption 2. |St(Λ)| > 0 for any Λ in its parameter space, L, where St(Λ) = IN −Mt(Λ) with∑R ∑R ′ ′ ′
Mt(Λ) = r=1 k=1 λrkGrkt, Λ = (Λ1, ...,ΛR) and Λr = (λr1, ..., λrR). L is compact and the true
Λ0 is in its interior.
Assumption 3. The Wrkt are uniformly bounded in both row and column sums in absolute value.
Also, St(Λ)
−1 is uniformly bounded, uniformly in Λ ∈ L.
Assumption 1-3 are standard and follow Lee et al. (2010) and Yang and Lee (2017) with a few
differences. Following Yang and Lee (2017), consistent QML estimation of the outcome function in
(2) proceeds as nr →∞. However, due to independence across t in Assumption 1, the time dimension
helps with consistency.6 In particular, it allows us to appeal to the arguments of Lee et al. (2010).
They consider a cross-section (T = 1) of a large number of independent networks with a homogeneous
peer-effect, and prove that the effect may be consistently estimated with QML, as either the number
of peers in a network or the number of independent networks increases. Similar to Lee et al. (2010),∑R ∑R
the system-wide network r=1 k=1 λrkGrkt in (2) can be seen as a single network at time t. The
6The iid assumption is restrictive, but as stated above we do not have a panel per se, so methods to account for
possible heteroskedasticity or autocorrelation are limited. One may relax the assumption by introducing a parametric
variance function or spatial autoregressive error structure, but this is left for future research.
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network changes over time, as managers change peer composition, and can be seen as T networks in a
single period, so asymptotic arguments similar to Lee at al. (2010) apply. That is, QML is consistent
as nrT →∞ for fixed R with u∗irt independent across t, and this is borne out in our simulations study.7
Relative to Lee et al. (2010), the only complication that QML estimation of (2) presents is that we
have multiple peer-effects (λrr) and competitor effects (λrk). However, they are time invariant, so time
variation in the networks Wrrt and Wrkt helps reduce the mean squared errors of their estimates.
The compact parameter space of Assumption 2 is also standard and ensures consistency and desir-
able asymptotic properties of QML. The implication is that St(Λ) can be inverted, ensuring stability
and an equilibrium where yt = St(Λ)
−1(Xtβ + ut). A positive determinant ensures the likelihood
function is well-defined. Following Yang and Lee (2017), since |S Nt(Λ)| = Πi=1(1− τit) where τit is an
eigenvalue of Mt(Λ), a sufficient condition satisfying this assumption is maxi τit < 1. From the spectral
radius theorem, maxi |τit| is less than any of its induced matrix norms, so the condition is satisfied when∑R||Mt(Λ)||∞ < 1 or ||Mt(Λ)||1 < 1. Since ||Mt(Λ)||∞ ≤ (maxr |k=1 λrk|)(maxr,k ||Wrkt||∞) and∑R||Mt(Λ)||1 ≤ (maxk |r=1 λrk|)(maxr,k ||Wrkt||1), a sufficient condition for Assumption 2 is that L is∑R ∑R
restricted such that either |λ | < (max ||W || )−1 or |λ −1k=1 rk r,k rkt ∞ r=1 rk| < (maxr,k ||Wrkt||1) for∑R
all r, k. The first condition reduces to |k=1 λrk| < 1 when the network matrices are row-normalized.8
This means the sum of the absolute values of the within- and cross-network effects from or to a network
must be bounded, while the row or column sum of Wrkt is also bounded.
These conditions have important implications for our model. First, Λ should be sparse if R is
large, so the effective number of network effects from or to a network is bounded. Second, the number
of linkages for each peer in Wrkt for all r, k should be fixed as nr increases. That is, Wrkt should
be sparse as nr increases. This is discussed in Lee (2004) and is borne out in our simulations, as
the network effect cannot be consistently estimated if Wrkt is not sparse when nr increases. Here,
R is fixed. Increasing R will produce richer network interaction structure, but it increases model
complexity. Moderate to small R may be appropriate in our context as network-pairwise interactions
may only exist when there are few networks in the market. In a market with many networks, the effect
of a single network on other networks may be negligible.
Assumption 3 is standard and limits spatial dependence to a manageable degree (e.g., Kelejian and
Prucha, 1999). This assumption will be met if both the sufficient conditions for Assumption 2 (above)
7As we shall see, large T is necessary to consistently estimate β2r after first-stage estimation of (2).
8These are sufficient conditions, which can be relaxed using the stationary-region search methodology proposed by
Elhorst, Lacombe and Piras (2012).
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are satisfied. We discuss sufficient conditions for identification of the model in the next section.
2.1.1 QML Estimation of the Outcome Function
We focus on Quasi-Maximum Likelihood (QML) estimation of the outcome function in (2).9 Following
Lee et al. (2010), we remove the bias term αt to avoid the incidental parameter problem (Neyman
and Scott, 1948) by transforming the model with projector JQ = Diag(Q1, ...,QR), where Qr is the
′
“within” transformation matrix, Q = I − 1 ι ι . Now, Q ι = 0 and Q u∗r nr nr nr r nr r r = Qrur. Therefore,nr
we have,
∑R ∑R
JQyt = JQ λrkGrktyt + JQX1tβ1 + JQut, t = 1, ..., T, (3)
r=1 k=1
′ ′ ′
where X1t = Diag(X11t, ...,X1Rt) .
Extensive study of identification conditions for network models and multivariate SAR models can
be found in Bramoulle et al. (2009), Cohen-Cole et al. (2017) and Yang and Lee (2017). Let Ξr be a
nr ×N matrix consisting of R horizontally concatenated blocks of size nr, with Inr in the rth position
and zeroes in the other R − 1 positions. Hence, Ξ1 = (In1 ,0), ΞR = (0, InR), and Ξr = (0, Inr ,0)
for r = 1, R, where the 0 matrices are appropriately conformable. Let Θ = Ξ G S−1rkt r rkt 0t X1tβ1,0 and∑R ∑R
S0t = IN − r=1 k=1 λrk,0Grkt. In the Online Appendix, we show that the true parameters Λ0 (as
defined in Assumption 2) and β1,0 can be identified from (3) under the condition,
Assumption 4. The matrix [QrX1rt,QrΘr1t, ...,QrΘrRt] have full column rank ∀r and some t.
The identification condition corresponds to the conditions in Liu and Lee (2010) and Yang and Lee
(2017), and it will be generally satisfied here, because we have multiple network matrices and exogenous
regressors from each r, which produces enough variation to identify the coefficients in our model.10
The disturbances in (3) are linearly dependent because the covariance matrix σ2rQr is singular.
Following Lee et al. (2010, p.150), we consider “an essentially equivalent but more effective transfor-
√
mation” to eliminate the network fixed-effects. Let the orthonormal matrix of Qr be [Pr, ιnr/ nr].
′
The columns in Pr are eigenvectors of Qr corresponding to the eigenvalue one, such that Prιnr = 0,
6
9One may also consider G2SLS or G3SLS to estimate the models (Kelejian and Prucha, 2004; Lee, 2003). However,
in spite of the simplicity of the 2SLS methods, they have some limitations, as discussed in Lee (2001a) and Lee (2007b).
GMM (e.g., Lin and Lee, 2010) may be more appropriate when there is unknown heteroskedasticity at the peer-level.
10An example that doesn’t satisfy the condition is when the Wrkt are complete, which is the case for our empirical
application. In section 4, we discuss an exclusion restriction in the weighting matrices to address the issue. When
exogenous network effects (WrrtXrt, say) are included in the model, the R matrices in Assumption 4 include additional
sub-matrices that are higher orders of Grrt.
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′ ′ ′ ′ ′
PrPr = Inr−1 and PrPr = Qr. Then, premultiplying (2) by JP = Diag(P1, ...,PR) leads to
∑R ∑R′ ′ ′ ′
JPyt = JP λrkGrktyt + JPX1tβ1 + JPut. (4)
r=1 k=1
′ ′
¯ ¯
′
¯ ¯
′ ′ ¯ ′Let yt = JPyt, X1t = JPX1t, ut = JPut, Grkt = JPGrktJ . Now, J
11
P PGrkt = GrktJP . This
implies,
∑R ∑R
ȳ ¯ ¯t = λrkGrktȳt + X1tβ1 + ūt. (5)
r=1 k=1
We derive the QML function and the concentrated QML function of (5) in the Online Appendix.
Call the QML estimates Λ̂ and β̂1 the “first-step” estimates. If all we care about is the peer- and
competitor-effects, then this is the only estimation step. However, if estimation of β2r and manage-
rial selection biases are important, then there are two additional estimation steps to consider. In the
“second-step” we estimate probabilities that the manager and opposing managers select teams of peers
and competitors into the peer- and competitor-networks, respectively. Estimation of these “selection
probability proceeds with Multinomial Logit (MNL) or Random Forest (RF), and allows us to calcu-
late the network-level selection bias of each manager as a single index.12 These procedures include
exogenous state variables, zrt, which explain the managers’ selections and will be discussed later. In
a “final-step,” we estimate β2 with a regression of the residuals from the first-step on network-level
covariates, x2t and the index.
Thus far, we have assumed that the endogeneity induced by the manager’s choices can be controlled
with a network level fixed-effect. The fixed-effect is then removed from the model with the within
transformation, so that the peer-effects and competitor-effects can be consistently estimated as nr →∞
with QMLE. We may also estimate coefficients on the explanatory variables that vary at the peer-level
(X1t). Unfortunately, coefficients on the explanatory variables that vary at the network-level (x2t) are
not identified. To address this issue, we set up a static game in period t to formulate and estimate the
selection bias.13 We follow and adapt the basic methodologies in the game theory literature for static
2.2 Bias Due to Strategic Interactions
11ḠrktJ
′
P = J
′
PGrktJQ = J
′
PGrkt(I−Diag(ιn1 ι
′
n1
/n1, ..., ιnR ι
′
nR
/nR)) = J
′
PGrkt, because Grkt is row-normalized
so J
′
PGrktDiag(ιn1 ι
′
n1
/n1, ..., ιnR ι
′
nR
/nR) = 0.
12Other flexible estimation methods may be used, such as kernel smoothing or local polynomial regressions (e.g. Bajari
et al. (2010)). RF is considered here as is known to be effective in handling high dimensional data and in predicting
nonlinear relationships.
13There may be other econometric remedies to address the endogeneity issue. Recently, two categories of methodologies
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games of incomplete information with multiple equilibria. Arguments follow Bajari et al. (2010).14
Each network r = 1, ..., R has a network manager who takes action art at time t from her finite
and discrete choice set of actions, art ∈ A = [0, 1, ...,K], so a
′
t = (a1t, ..., aRt) is a vector of actions
for all managers.15 Ideally, A would be the set of all possible combinations of nr workers from the
n0 workers at the manager’s disposal (i.e., all possible values of drt, so the set of observed actions
of all managers corresponds to a mapping from the matrix Dt). However, in practice considering all
combinations may be infeasible and econometrically undesirable. One solution would be to restrict
A to only those choices that are observed in the sample (see Horrace et al., 2016). For example, an
NBA coach may never choose a lineup of his five worst players, so we can exclude this action from
the choice set. Alternatively, if there is some variable that maps the characteristics of each potential
combination of workers into fewer choices, then this may be more practical. This may also allow us to
specify adjacency matrices that satisfy Assumption 4. For example, an NBA coach may be interested
in creating positional mismatches (e.g., guards defending forwards and vice versa) between his players
and the opposing team’s players. Here, the choice of the number of guards may summarize the coach’s
actions, so K = 6, and it may imply that network interactions should be based on player position
types. We use this action set and a network adjacency matrix based on player position in our NBA
application.
Let a
′
−rt = (a1t, ..., a(r−1)t, a(r+1)t, ..., aRt) be the vector of actions for all managers, excluding
manager r. Each manager has a vector of exogenous state variables zrt, so the vector of state variables
(i.e., market conditions) for all R managers is zt = (z
′
1t, ..., z
′
Rt)
′
.16 The state variable zt is common
knowledge and observable to the econometrician. Manager r is also subject to an idiosyncratic shock
over her possible actions, ert(art) ∈ [ert(0), ..., ert(K)]. These shocks, ert, are iid over art and over r
and t with density Ge(ert). The shocks are private information to manager r, and are unobservable
to the econometrician. Let ert be the K + 1 vector of ert(art) for all art ∈ A. Then, managers
simultaneously choose their actions based on their individual information sets {zt, ert}, so manager r’s
decision rule is a scalar function art = ηr(zt, ert). Under the chosen actions, networks produce single
outcome, yt.
Let manager r’s scalar utility function be vr(art, zt, ert) = πr(art,a−rt, zt) + ert(art). Then, the
have been proposed to address endogeneity in formation of spatial or network links: One is a (Bayesian) “One-step Full
Information” approach by Goldsmith and Imbens (2013) and Hsieh and Lee (2016), and the other is a “Multiple-step
Control Function” approach by Qu and Lee (2015) and Horrace et al. (2016).
14Generalizing the following model to a dynamic game is left for future research.
15Following Bajari et al. (2010), we assume without loss of generality that A is the same for all managers.
16Per Hoshino (2019) it is desirable that zrt contain variables excluded from (2).
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conditional choice probability of r choosing ar at a given realization of zt is given by
δr(art = k|zt) =
∫
1{ηr(zt, ert) = k}dGe(ert), (6)
which may be interpreted as the beliefs formed by r’s opponents regarding r’s decision. Here, δr is a
scalar function. Since network manager r does not know the other managers’ decisions at the time of
her decision, her strategy is based on her expected payoff for choosing action art,
Vr(art, zt, ert) =
∑
a−rt
∏
k 6=r
δk(akt|zt)πr(art,a−rt, zt) + ert(art) = ϕr(art, zt) + ert(art). (7)
Here, ϕr is the deterministic part of the expected payoff function and is a scalar function. We can see
that the expected payoff function is similar to the standard random utility model. The only difference
is that the probability distributions over other managers’ actions are affecting manager r’s utility.
Then, it is straightforward that art will be chosen for a given realization of zt, if and only if
Vr(art, zt, ert) > max
a
′
rt 6=art
Vr(a
′
rt, zt, ert)⇔ ϕr(art, zt) + ert(art) > max
a
′
rt 6=art
ϕr(a
′
rt, zt) + ert(a
′
rt), (8)
for art, a
′
rt ∈ A. It follows that
δr(art|zt) = Pr[ max
a
′
rt 6=art
ϕr(a
′
rt, zt)− ϕr(art, zt) + ert(a
′
rt)− ert(art) < 0],
in equilibrium.17 The equilibrium can be seen as a Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium (BNE) in a probability
space with measure δr, r = 1, ..., R , and summarized by a best-response mapping that maps a compact
set to itself (i.e. [0, 1]R → [0, 1]R). It is also continuous in δr, so equilibrium existence follows from
Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem.18 The next section formulates the selection bias from δr.
A standard approach to formulate the selection bias is to assume the outcome error, urt, and the
payoff function error, ert(art), are statistically dependent. This idea can be traced back to Heckman’s
(1979) selection model and Lee’s (1983) generalization. Let ε∗rt = maxa′rt 6=art
ϕr(a
′
rt, zt)−ϕr(art, zt) +
ert(a
′
rt)− ert(art) and let ϕr(zt) = [ϕr(0, zt), ..., ϕr(K, zt)] be a K + 1 vector,19 so gir(uirt, ε∗rt|ϕr(zt))
2.2.1 Formulation of the Selection Bias
17In the game literature the focus is often to estimate the payoff function, and doing so requires additional structure
be imposed on the function. However, this is not the focus here, so additional structure is not necessary.
18See Bajari et al. (2010) for a simple example.
19The ε∗rt is a function of art, but it is suppressed here for notational simplicity.
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is the joint distribution of uirt and ε
∗
rt, which depends on ϕr(zt) and may differ across i, in general.
Following Bourguignon et al. (2007), if the two errors are dependent,
∫ ∫ 0 uirtgir(uirt, ε∗ |ϕr(zt))
E(uirt|art,ϕr(zt)) = E(u |ε∗rt 0,ϕr(zt)) = rtirt < ∗∗ dεrtduirt
−∞ Pr(εrt < 0|ϕr(zt)) (9)
= αir(ϕr(zt)).
The correlation may exist when the two errors contain a common component, unobserved by the
econometrician but observed (or predicted) by the manager. In (9) the joint distribution gir(·) varies
by peers in a network, which may be true if individual peers respond to the common shock differently
(or the manager selects workers based on individual performances). However, in team production it
may be reasonable to assume that the manager is optimizing team performance and not individual
performance. Therefore, peer-level heterogeneity may be negligible, conditional on her selection. Also,
note again that we do not have a true panel of data, so it is difficult to model and account for peer-level
heterogeneity, in general. Therefore, we assume the following to arrive at a network-specific selection
bias.
Assumption 5. The joint distributions of uirt and ε
∗
rt conditional on ϕr(zt) are identical for every
peer i = 1, ..., nr in network r at time t.
Then E(urt|art,ϕr(zt)) = ιnrαr(ϕr(zt)), which are network specific fixed-effects due to the strategic
actions of the network managers. This is what Manski (1993) calls a correlated effect. We simply
follow the standard solution to the correlated effects problem by including a network-level fixed-effect,
but we explicitly model the correlated effect by modeling a managerial selection equation. This allows
us to separately identify the managerial effect from other network-level coefficients (β2r) in (2).
Per Dahl (2002), estimation of the unknown control function αr(ϕr(zt)) suffers from the “the curse
of dimensionality” due to the presence of a large number of alternatives and its dependence on the
unknown function ϕr(zt). To make estimation feasible, restrictions need to be imposed on the control
function. We consider parametric and semi-parametric approaches following Lee (1983) and Dahl
(2002), respectively.
1. Lee’s approach: Let the distribution of ε∗rt be Fr. Following Lee (1983) and Horrace et al.
(2016), we can reduce the dimensionality of the selection bias by the transformation Jr(·) ≡
Φ−1(Fr(·)), where Φ−1 is the inverse of the standard normal CDF. Then, Jr(ε∗rt) becomes a
standard normal random variable. For notational simplicity, let Jr(ε
∗
rt) ≡ εrt. Per Schmertmann
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(1994), Dahl (2002) and Bourguignon et al. (2007), it is implicitly assumed in Lee’s approach
that the joint distribution of uirt and εrt does not depend on ϕr(zt). That is, E[uirt|εrt <
Jr(0),ϕr(zt)] = E[uirt|εrt < Jr(0)].20 To obtain an explicit parametric form of the bias, we
further assume εrt and uirt are i.i.d over i and t with joint normal distribution,   (u 2 )irt  σ r  r σ12 = N 0,  ,
εrt σ12r 1
then it can be shown that,
φ[Φ−1{δr(art|zt)}]
αr(ϕr(zt)) = −σ12r , (10)
δr(art|zt)
a scalar, where δr(art|zt) is the selection probability from (6).
2. Dahl’s approach: We make the index sufficiency assumption of Dahl (2002) such that
αr(ϕr(zt)) = ψr(δr(art|zt)), (11)
where ψr(·) is an unknown scalar function that may be estimated non-parametrically. Per Dahl,
this assumes that the selection probability δr(art|zt) exhausts all information about the behaviors
of the two errors. That is, the joint distribution of uirt and ε
∗
rt depends on ϕr(zt) only through
δr(art|zt).
2.2.2 Estimation of the Selection Bias
To estimate the strategic bias induced by the managers and the coefficients on network-varying exoge-
nous variables (x2rt), we consider a three-step estimation procedure as follows:
ˆ ˆ1. First Step: Estimate Λ and β1 from (5), and for r = 1, ..., R and t = 1, ..., T compute residuals,
′ ∑
υ̂
R ˆ ˆ
rt = ιnr (yrt − k=1 λrkWrktykt −X1rtβ1r)/nr.
ˆ2. Second Step: Estimate the selection probability δr(art|zt) for r = 1, ..., R and t = 1, ..., T
using a parametric or nonparametric model. We use MNL for a parametric approach and RF
20See Schmertmann (1994), Dahl (2002) and Bourguignon et al. (2007) for more detail about the implications of the
restrictions on the joint distribution of the errors in Lee’s and Dahl’s approaches. The assumption implies that the
′ ′
correlations between uirt and ert(art)− ert(art) must have the same sign for all art = art, which means in our context
that the random shock should have the same implication to the different actions (i.e., it can have a positive or negative
effect, but should be the same for all the actions). This is relaxed slightly in the Dahl’s approach where the bivariate
covariances can differ in sign but only as a function of the δr(art|zt).
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for a nonparametric approach. The statistical properties of the MNL are well-known, and one
can use the Murphy and Topel (1985) correction to account for sampling variability of the
estimated probabilities in calculating standard errors in the final-step estimates below. For RF
we use the bias reduction method proposed by Chernozhukov et al. (2018) which uses Neyman-
orthogonal scores to remove bias in semiparametric models, where the nonparametric component
is estimated with a machine learning method. The method allows the final-step estimators to be
√
T -consistent, even when RF converges more slowly. To ensure that RF consistently estimates
δ̂r, we restrict the maximum number of splits in a tree (equivalently, the depth of a tree) based on
the asymptotic results of Scornet et al. (2015) and Wager and Walther (2015).21 In simulations,
we use two types of cross-validation methods to tune the maximum number of splits, and examine
their effect on the mean squared error of the final-step estimates.22
3. Final Step: The selection bias and β2r can be estimated from the OLS regression υ̂rt = x2rtβ2r+
γr(δ̂r(art|zt))+ξrt where ξrt is an i.i.d. error term and γr(δ̂r(art|zt)) is either given by the right-
hand side of (10) with δ̂ substituted for δ (Lee’s approach) or by ψr(·) in (11) (Dahl’s approach).
For Dahl’s approach, we use polynomial approximations of ψr and select polynomial order using
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).23 Newey (1994, 1997, 2009) and Andrew (1991) provide
regularity conditions and basis functions for semi-parametric models, like Dahl’s approach.24
In our simulations and application, we use the bootstrap to calculate standard errors of the
final-step estimates, thereby accounting for variability in estimates upon which they are based.
Our simulation study is for R = 3 networks. To give a concrete example, we consider three real estate
companies competing in a region. Each group has nr = 5 (or nr = 10) agents and each agent in a group
is responsible for different parts of the region. We assume that if the agents’ areas of responsibility are
adjacent, then they are competing across networks or cooperating within their network. We randomly
assign agents into areas within the region and use a contiguity weighting scheme to specify connections.
We generate random matrices, Wrkt for r, k = 1, 2, 3, where each entry is randomly assigned with 0
3. Simulation Experiments
21The consistency results in Scornet et al. (2015) and Wager and Walther (2015) are for regression trees, while we use
classification trees. We conjecture the their regularity condition is appropriate here. Simulations support this conjecture.
22In our simulation and application, random forest is implemented in Matlab using the command fitcensemble.
23Newey et al. (1990) use the Generalized Cross-Validation (GCV) of Craven and Wahba (1979) in this context, which
is approximately equivalent to AIC (Wang et al., 2007).
24For consistency and asymptotic normality, the number of basis functions should increase with the sample size. The
number of basis functions will be selected by the econometrician in practice.
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[ ]
W11t W12t W13t
or 1, while maintaining symmetry of the interaction matrix, W = Wt 21t W22t W23t . We then row-[ ] W31t W32t W33t
λ11 λ12 λ13
[ ]
0.4 −0.2 0.1
normalize each W e λ21 λrkt. W set Λ = 22 λ23 = 0.2 0 0 so the first network has the strongest
λ31 λ32 λ −33 0.1 0 0.2
within network effect (λ11 = 0.4) but is also strongly affected by the other two networks: negatively
by the second network (λ12 = −0.2) and positively by the third network (λ13 = 0.1). The second
network is only affected by the first network but has no within network effect. The third network is
only affected by the first, and has an intermediate within network effect (λ = 0.2), relative to others.25
The agents in the three networks produce outcomes over T = 500 (or T = 1, 000) time periods.
The data generating process for the outcome function is,
y1t = λ11W11ty1t + λ12W12ty2t + λ13W13ty3t + X11tβ11 + ιnrx21tβ21 + ιnrα1t + u1t,
y2t = λ21W21ty1t + λ22W22ty2t + λ23W23ty3t + X12tβ12 + ιn (12)rx22tβ22 + ιnrα2t + u2t,
y3t = λ31W31ty1t + λ32W32ty2t + λ33W33ty3t + X13tβ13 + ιnrx23tβ23 + ιnrα3t + u3t,
where X1rt and x2rt for r = 1, 2, 3 are the peer-level exogenous variables and the network-level ex-
ogenous variables, respectively. The X1rt contains two regressors drawn from a bivariate normal
distribution with a variance of 1 and a correlation of 0.5. The network-level exogenous variable, x2rt,
contains an intercept and two regressors, x2rt(0), x2rt(1) and x2rt(2) (respectively), independently
drawn from a standard normal distribution. The network-level exogenous variables will be specified
in greater detail later, so as to induce a selection bias into the system. The network-level exogenous
variables will be eliminated from the model with the within transformation but will be recovered in
the estimation of the network managers’ strategic bias in a final step. We set all elements of β1r (i.e.,
β1r(1) and β1r(2)) and β2r (i.e., β2r(0), β2r(1), and β2r(2)) equal to 1 for r = 1, 2, 3, and each element
in urt is distributed iidN(0, 2) for r = 1, 2, 3.
The αrt for r = 1, 2, 3 are the strategic bias terms, and we adapt the experiment design by Schmert-
mann (1994) and Bourguignon et al. (2007) to model them. For simplicity, we assume the choice spe-
cific utility function for the managers of the three networks are the same (i.e., ϕr = ϕ). For each time
period t, the manager of the network r has three choices on her network, A = (1, 2, 3). Then her deci-
′
sion is made by the following rule:26 an option s ∈ A is chosen if only if ϕ(s, zt)+erts > ϕ(s , zt)+e ′rts
′
for ∀s = s. The zt contains an intercept and two regressors, zt(0), zt(1), zt(2), and the two regressors6
25We experimented with different Λ and the results were qualitatively the same.
26Simulating the selection equation precedes simulating the outcome function, but for the purpose of exposition we
described the outcome function first.
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are independently drawn from U(0, 1). The erts for s = 1, 2, 3 are independently drawn from a Gumbel
distribution, which naturally leads to the familiar MNL specification. The Gumbel distribution DGP
provides an estimation advantage for MNL. The choice-specific utility function, ϕ(s, zt), is specified in
two ways, linear and non-linear, such that
1. Linear: ϕ(1, zt) = 0; ϕ(2, zt) = 1 + zt(1); and ϕ(3, zt) = 2 + zt(2).
2. Non-linear: ϕ(1, zt) = 0; ϕ(2, zt) = Beta5,1(zt(1)); and ϕ(3, zt) = Beta5,1(zt(2)),
where Betaa,b(·) is the beta density with shape parameters a and b. Here, ϕ(1, zt) is normalized to zero
for identification of MNL. Given the two specifications of ϕ above, we generate two sets of T choices
for each manager r. Next we set up a correlation between zt and x2rt such that x2rt(j) = 0.9× zt(j)
plus a draw from a N(0, (1− 0.92)/12) random variable for j = 1, 2 and r = 1, 2, 3.27.
Following Schmertmann (1994), let ζrt = (ζ ′rts , ζ ′′rts ) = (e ′ −rts erts, e ′′ −rts erts), where s is the
′ ′′
selected option, and s and s are the non-selected options. Also, let Fe(ζrt) = 1 + exp(−ζ ′rts ) +
exp(−ζ ′′rts ). We generate the selection bias in two ways:28
1. Lee’s model (Monotonicity)
[ ]
α (ζ ) = ρ Φ−1
Fe(ζrt)
rt rt (Fe(ζrt)) + , (13)
2φ[Φ−1{Fe(ζrt)}]
and ρ is a scalar, which we discuss below.
2. Dahl model (Non-monotonicity)
′
αrt(ζrt) = c1Φ [ζrtρ2 + sin(4ζrtρ2)]− c2 where ρ2 = (ρ21, ρ22) . (14)
(13) is simply the conditional mean of the residuals of the outcome equation under Lee’s (1983)
approach, and (14), proposed by Schmertmann (1994), is an example of a violation of the assumptions
in Lee (1983). In particular, it violates monotonicity of of the selection bias. We expect Lee’s approach
will work well for (13), whereas Dahl’s approach will work better for (14). Following Schmertmann
(1994), we adjust the experimental parameters, ρ, ρ2, c1 and c2, so that the bias term explains roughly
25% of the variation in the outcome. Therefore, we have a total of four different DGPs for the
27The correlation between zt and x2rt is to make sure selection bias works for x2rt, not only for the intercept. The
large correlation is to make bias apparent so estimators are easily contrasted.
28See Schmertmann (1994) and Bourguignon et al. (2007) for other forms of the selection bias.
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selection bias: two types of choice-specific utility functions (linear and non-linear), and two types of
bias generating processes (monotonic and non-monotonic). With all variables generated, the outcome
variables, yrt for r = 1, 2, 3, are generated from the reduced form of (12) for each r and t.
For estimation, we consider several different approaches. In the first step, we estimate the network
effects with and without selectivity bias correction. That is, “with selectivity bias correction” means
estimation of the within-transformed model in (5), and “without selectivity bias correction” means
estimation of (2) ignoring αt. In the second stage we estimate selection probabilities, using standard
MNL and RF. For RF we experiment with tuning the maximum number of splits in a tree using two
cross-validation methods: one based on out-of-bag classification error and another based on five-fold
cross-validated error. We compared these methods to the common practice of naively setting the
maximum number of splits to T − 1 (a “fully grown” tree or a “tree without tuning”). To save space,
a discussion of these methods and complete simulation results are reported in the Online Appendix.
However, we found that five-fold cross-validation worked best in terms of bias and variance of the
final-step estimates, so in the main text we only report RF results based on this tuning method.
Next, using the probability estimates we formulate the selection bias term γr using both the Lee
approach in (10) and the Dahl approach, for which we use polynomial approximations of ψr in (11).
Then, we estimate the network-level coefficients, β2r, in two ways: with and without the estimated
selection bias term γr included in the regression of υ̂rt on x2rt. These are reported along with ρ from
Lee’s model in (13) when appropriate. We perform 1,000 draws for each simulation design.
We do not report coefficients results for (X1rt), but they are available upon request. Table 1 reports the
empirical mean, standard deviation (SD), and root mean squared error 〈RMSE〉 of the network effect
estimates over 1,000 simulation draws. The first column contains the true values of the effects, and
the second and third columns contain estimates without selectivity bias correction for the {nr, T} =
{5, 500} and {10, 1000} designs, respectively. These estimates are contaminated by the managers’
network selections and are (mostly upward) biased. For example, in the first row λ11 = 0.4 is estimated
with a mean of 0.651 in the {5, 500} design (column 2), and the bias worsens to a mean of 0.7598 as
{nr, T} increases to {10, 1000} (column 3). Columns 4-7 are for various {nr, T} designs, but with
selectivity bias correction (i.e., the within transformation in (5)). The last two columns employ both
the selectivity bias correction and a bootstrap finite sample bias correction, discussed below.
3.1. Simulated Results: Peer-effects (λrr) and Competitor-effects (λrk) Estimation
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Notice that the empirical SD of the estimates with “no bias correction” is smaller
election bias correction only.” For λ11 = 0.4 in the {5, 500} design, compare SD (0.013
as correction (column 2) to SD (0.0192) with bias correction (column 4). This occurs b
thin transformation of the bias corrected estimates reduces the effective sample size.
e that the number of peers in a network, nr, and the number of time periods, T , have differ
the bias and variance of the selection bias corrected estimates (columns 4-7). First, as T
decreases, but the opposite is true for nr. This is because, in our setup, the networ
ore dense as nr increases due to the increased number of effective peers or competitors.
harder to estimate the network effect consistently because within-variation in a network
than with
“s 8) with no
bi ecause the
wi We can also
se ent effects
on increases,
SD k becomes
m This makes
it decreases.
Lee (2004) analyses this phenomenon, and Lee et al. (2007) provide simulated evidence suggesting
that this may be avoided if network weights are constant as network size increases. Thus, if network
sparsity is maintained, increasing nr or T will have the same effect on the variance of the estimates.
29
Moreover, moderately sized nr is important for reducing bias. For most cases in Table 1, when
nr = 10, SD is approximately equal to RMSE, implying that the empirical distributions of the estimates
are well centered on the true values. However, when nr = 5, there is a sizable finite sample bias across
all the network effect estimates which persists as T increases. This may be a concern in our empirical
application where the network size is only 5. Therefore, we use a parametric (residual-based) bootstrap
to remove the bias here and in our application. From the full sample, we obtain initial QML estimates,
Λ̂0, and the residuals. The residuals contain the errors as well as selectivity bias and the effects of
the group level regressors. Then we generate b = 1, ..., B bootstrap samples using Λ̂0 as the true
parameter in the following way: we randomly sample with replacement a set of residuals for our three
networks for a given t, so that we can maintain network dependency in our data over time. Then we use
the reduced form of (12) to generate bootstrap outcomes y∗ and compute bootstrap estimates Λ̂∗(b).
Bootstrap bias correction is then done by Λ̃ = 2Λ̂0− 1B
∑B
b=1 Λ̂
∗(b). We set B = 300 in our simulations
and empirical application.30 A similar bootstrap bias correction is considered in Kim and Sun (2016)
for nonlinear panel data models with fixed-effects. We also use these bootstrap samples to compute
the standard errors of the estimates of the network-level coefficients, β2r, in the final-step estimates
below.31 For the first step, the estimated peer- and competitor-effects in the last two columns of Table
1 are well centered on their true values even when nr = 5.
29Additional unreported simulations confirm these sparsity results.
30QML estimation in the first step is computationally costly, so having a large B is not practical. We examined the
effect of B on the estimation results and found that B = 300 provides reasonable results without computational burden.
31For these estimates, the bootstrap can be seen as a non-parametric bootstrap.
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3.2 Simulated Results: Network-Level Coefficients (β2r) Estimation
Table 2 reports selected estimation results of the network-level coefficients. Even though they are
selected results (to save space), they are not atypical. Full results are in the Online Appendix. All
these results are computed from the final-step regression of υ̂rt (the residuals from the first-step) on
x2rt with or without the selection bias correction term (γr) as described in section 2.2.2. We report
both MNL and RF results but only RF results with five-fold cross-validation tuning.32 The first-step
estimation includes bootstrap finite sample bias correction and selectivity bias correction in all cases,
corresponding to the last two columns of Table 1. Table 2 presents averages over all R = 3 networks
of the empirical bias (Bias), root mean squared error (RMSE), and bootstrap standard error coverage
rate with a target rate of 0.95 (95% Coverage Rate) for estimates of the network-level coefficients
(β2r) over the 1,000 simulation draws for each of four DGPs described above. For Dahl’s approach,
estimates of the intercept and the polynomial terms are omitted from the table.33
Columns 2-4 under “No Bias Term” contain the regression results without the selection bias term,
γr. Obviously, these estimates show much larger RMSE than the other estimates in the table (columns
5-16), which include the bias correction term. For example, for “DGP1” in the {5, 500} design,
compare the RMSE for β2(1) of 0.42 (column 3) to 0.25 (column 6). The next four columns (5-8) and
the following two columns (9 and 10) under “MNL” contain results for Lee’s and Dahl’s approaches,
respectively, when MNL is used to estimate selection probabilities. Similarly, the last six columns (11-
16) under “RF” contain a corresponding set of results when RF is used for estimation of the selection
probabilities. As expected, Lee’s approach with MNL outperforms the others in DGP1 in terms of bias
and RMSE, whereas Dahl’s approach with MNL shows the best performance in DGP2. Interestingly,
when we switch between DGP1 and DGP2, performance deterioration of Lee’s approach is mainly
due to increased bias, while it is an increased variance for Dahl’s approach. For DGP3 and DGP4,
when RF is used to estimate the selection probabilities there is smaller bias when compared to MNL
estimation of the probabilities. In these cases, Lee’s approach with MNL exhibits similar deterioration
as in DGP2, but Dahl with MNL shows a somewhat different pattern: the bias increases but variance
decreases in many cases. Notice that Dahl’s RMSE is improved when we move from DGP1 to DGP3.
Overall, if we compare the performance of the MNL estimates to the RF estimates across the various
DGPs, RF appears more robust to different designs in terms of bias, RMSE and the coverage rate.
32Five-fold cross-validation worked best in terms of RMSE of the final-step estimates. The results based on the other
tuning method and non-tuning results are in the Online Appendix.
33Empirical standard deviation (SD) and average bootstrap standard error estimates (Avg. Bootstrap SE) for the
estimates are included in the Online Appendix.
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4. Application to the 2015-16 NBA Season
4.1 Empirical model and variables
We apply our network competition model to NBA data for 30 teams over the 2015-2016 regular
season. The primitive play-by-play data were purchased and downloaded from BigDataBall.com. We
then formatted the data to the player-period level, where a period represents any contiguous game
period in which the same ten players are on the court. This formatting is similar to that done in the
calculation of the player statistic Real Plus Minus. We tabulate player box-score data to obtain Wins
Produced for each player in each period for our outcome variable.34 The league plays 1,230 regular-
season games per season (41 home games for each of 30 teams per regular season). Therefore, our
data spans 3,690 regular-season games, consisting of roughly 30 time periods per game. This produces
112,204 time periods in which we observe the play of 10 players i at a time, producing a total of
1,122,040 observations. In each game a coach typically has 15 players to fill a network of five players
at a time.35 Following Horrace et al. (2016), we drop time periods less than 30 seconds and overtime
periods.36 This results in 83,334 time periods for the league, roughly 833,000 observations in total.
Outcome Function: Since competition in sports is head-to-head, we can consider a restricted version
of the general model, where there is only one peer network and one competitor network in each time
period. In this case, the outcome function for team r and k in period t of game g is
yrtg = λrrWrrtgyrtg + λrkWrktgyktg + X1,rtgβ1r + ι5x2,rtgβ2r + ι5αrt + urtg
(15)
yktg = λkkWkktgyktg + λkrWkrtgyrtg + X1,ktgβ1k + ι5x2,ktgβ2k + ι5αkt + uktg
where yrtg and yktg are the 5× 1 outcome vector of team r’s and team k’s chosen lineup in period t of
game g, respectively, and Wrrtg and Wkktg are the 5× 5 zero diagonal and row-normalized matrices
for the within-network interactions, and Wrktg and Wkrtg are similarly defined matrices for cross-
network interactions. The X1,rtg and X1,ktg are matrices of the player-varying exogenous variables
for team r and k’s lineup in period t of game g, respectively. The x2,rtg and x2,ktg are matrices of
34See, e.g., Berri (1999). Wins produced is a continuous weighted average of individual player offensive and defensive
statistics that will be defined in what follows. Wins Produced is highly predictive of team success and is measurable at
the individual level.
35Understanding the effect of player injuries (or player ineligibility) on the coaches’ decisions is left for future research.
Sports injuries are analogous to worker absenteeism.
36Horrace et al. (2016) also drop time periods where the number of player types in any active lineup is less than 2,
where “player types” are Guards or Forwards. Defining heterogeneous types aids in identification of the model, as we
shall see. However, we found that their restriction eliminated too many of our data, so we relaxed the restriction to “less
than 1,” which removed only 240 out of 112,204 time periods.
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the network-level exogenous variables which, as previously noted, will be eliminated from the model
with the within transformation, but the coefficients will be recovered in the estimation of the coach’s
strategic bias. The urtg and uktg are 5× 1 error term vectors, in which each element is assumed to be
iid(0, σ2r) and iid(0, σ
2
k), respectively. The likelihood function of (15) is a special case of the likelihood
derived in the Online Appendix.
Selection Equation: Ideally, coaches would select from all possible five-player lineups at their dis-
posal, and each network would be specified as complete (i.e., wij = 1/4 for i = j, wij = 0 otherwise),
so each selected peer would interact with all other selected peers in the lineup in the same way. Then,
the set of all actions A would map directly in to the network specification. However, if we specify
complete networks, then (5) is not identified. Identification requires sparsity (exclusion restrictions) in
the networks for Assumption 4 to be satisfied. Instead, we assume that NBA coaches employ a strategy
to create favorable offensive mismatches against the opposing team. That is, coaches are interested
in creating easy scoring opportunities, where opposing guards are defending his taller forwards (close
to the basket) or where opposing forwards are defending his quicker guards (way from the basket).37
Therefore, we choose the number of active guards in the current period (Nguardrt) for the dependent
variable in our selection equation. Therefore, the model is specified as the multinomial logit model
(MNL) such that the action set for team r in period t is [0, 1, ..., 5], representing the number of guards
in the current period. Since the coach’s decision rule may be highly non-linear, we also estimate the
selection equation using RF with five-fold CV. Selected actions are a function of state variables zgrt,
which we describe below.
Network: Given our assumption that coaches are interested in creating positional mismatches, we
would like to specify our network adjacency matrices to reflect this. With this is mind, we use the
same-type peer-effect weight matrix considered in Horrace et al. (2016), where “types” are the player
positions: Guards or Forwards, with Forwards including Centers. That is, the same-type weight
matrix is W, where W0 = [w0,ij ] is an adjacency matrix with w0,ij = 1 if the i
th and jth players are
both guards or forwards.38 Then row-normalize W0 so that Wι5 = ιN . This network specification
assumes that each individual is affected only by the same type of agents in his network and the same
type of agents from the opposing network (an exclusion restriction). This restriction is required for
identification of the model, in particular to separately identify the network parameters from the other
6
37The precedent for this assumption on strategy can be found in Calvo et al. (2017) and Marmarinos et al. (2016).
38We realize that this is a fairly restrictive network specification. An alternative would be to create network connections
based on the frequency that players pass to one another, but this is left for future research.
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input parameters. We can easily see that if there are no heterogeneous types, we can not distinguish
the competitor-effect from the network fixed-effect induced by a manager. For more details on iden-
tification and the use of heterogeneous type restrictions, see Horrace et al. (2016) and Horrace and
′
Jung (2018). For example, let’s assume the lineup for team r is [F, F,G, F,G] , and for team k it
′
is [G,F, F,G,G] in period t of game g, where F = Forward and G = Guard. Then, the network
matrices in (18) are given by:
   1 1   1 1 
0 1 0 1

0 0 0 0 1 1
 0 0 0 0 0 02 2 2 2 2 21 0 0 1 0  2 2 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 00 0 1 0 02 Wrrtg =  2      0 0 0 0 1   2 2 3 3 3, W = 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1kktg 1 , W tg = 1rk 3 3 3 , Wkrtg = 1 1 0 1 03 3 3 .
1 1 0 0 0
1
2

0 0 0 12
  1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 02 2 1 1 2 2 2 20 0 00 0 1 0 0 1 12 2 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 13 3 3 2 2
Variables: We use theWins Produced measure based on the work of sports economist David Berri
(Berri, 1999; Berri et al. 2006) for the outcome,
yirtg =(0.064 · 3PTirtg + 0.032 · 2PTirtg + 0.017 · FTirtg + 0.034 ·REBirtg + 0.033 · STLirtg
+ 0.020 ·BLKirtg − 0.034 ·MFGirtg − 0.015 ·MFTirtg − 0.034 · TOirtg)/Minsirtg,
where 3PTirtg, 2PTirtg and FTirtg are 3-point field goals made, 2-points field goals made, and free
throws made, respectively, REBirtg is rebounds, STLirtg is steals, BLKirtg is blocks, MFGirtg is
missed field goals, MFTirtg is missed free throws, TOirtg is turnovers, and Minsirtg is minutes played
by player i of team r in period t of game g. Wins produced per minute (or wins per minute) estimates
a player’s marginal win productivity based upon player-level variables related to team-winning. It rep-
resents a leading measure of NBA player production.39 The player-varying exogenous input variables
in the outcome equation (X1,rtg) are Experienceirtg and Fatigueirtg. The Experienceirtg variable is
minutes played from the start of the game to the end of period t-1, and Fatigueirtg is minutes continu-
ously played until the end of period t-1. We also included player dummies to control for player-specific
heterogeneity. The network-level exogenous variables (x2,rtg) are the RPIrtg of the opposing team
from the end of the previous season (Relative Percentage Index, a measure of the opposition’s power
rating from the previous season), Homertg, an indicator variable for a home game, and 2ndHalfrtg,
an indicator equal to 1 if t is in the second half.
We use nine exogenous variables for the determinants in the selection equation (zrtg). The
39See www.basketball-reference.com/about/bpm.html or wagesofwins.com/how-to-calculate-wins-produced/ for dis-
cussions of wins produced. The NBA scales this statistic to the game level by multiplying by 48 minutes per game. It
is typically reported at the player level but we report it the team level in Table 1.
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CurScore Diffrtg variable is the “current” score differential between the two teams in the last period
(T−1), and CumScoreDiffrtg is a “cumulative” version of the score differential from the beginning of
the game up to and including period t− 1. The CumFoulrtg (CurFoulrtg) variable is the cumulative
(current) number of fouls committed at the end of period t − 1 (in period t − 1). The CurT imertg
variable is the game time at the start of period t; the Durationrtg variable is the duration of period
t−1. Because we are using the number of guards in the game as our selection equation outcome, we in-
clude predetermined measures of the number of guards as determinants of selection. The NguardRrtg
variable is the Number of guards available to the coach (on the Roster) at the beginning of the game.40
The NguardOPPrtg variable is the Number of guards that the OPPosing coach had in the game last
period. We also include the one period lag of the dependent variable (Nguardr(t−1)g) in the selection
equation. Descriptive statistics for the variables in the outcome and selection equations are in the
Online Appendix. In the next section we report the first-step structural estimates of team chemistry
and team rivalries for the 2015-16 NBA regular season. All other estimates are reported and discussed
in the Online Appendix.
4.3 Results
Table 3 contains the structural estimates of team chemistry (within-team peer-effects) and team rivalry
(cross-team competitor-effects) from first-stage QML estimation of (5). The table contains a subset
of the estimated structural parameters by division. That is, we do not report all competitor-effects,
λrk and λkr, for all match-ups for the 30 teams. Instead, to save space we report competitor-effects
for within-division rivals for each of six divisions in the table (e.g., Atlantic Division of the East
Conference). These divisions (based on geography) tend to be the most competitive rivalries, and
divisional teams play the most head-to-head games over the season (four games). This choice reduces
the number of reported competitor-effect estimates from 30×29 = 870 to a manageable 6×(5×4) = 120
with relatively smaller standard errors.41 Estimates in the table incorporate bootstrap finite sample
correction, and standard errors are based on the asymptotic distribution42
Peer-effects measure team chemistry conditional on strategies, abilities and opposition and do not
measure team quality. Like a talented shooter can play well even with sub-optimal shot selection,
a talented team can perform well even given low peer-effects. Table 3 contains the peer-effect and
40It only varies across games, and does not change within a game, even when a guard is injured.
41The interaction map for the entire league is available from the authors by request.
42We use the asymptotic results of Lee et al. (2010) with appropriate modifications.
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competitor-effect estimates for 30 NBA teams in the 2015-16 season. Bounded on the unit-circle, a
peer-effect close to 1 (−1) indicates good (poor) conditional team chemistry, as player performance is
positively (negatively) linked to average teammate performance. Consider Table 3 where Milwaukee
(MIL) had the largest positive peer-effect (λrr) of 0.044. That is, when the team’s average “wins
produced” increases, the team’s performance is enhanced by virtue of its good chemistry, conditional
on coaching strategy and other environmental and performance variables. The estimates are structural
parameters and not the reduced-form effects.43 Reduced-form effects by division are presented in the
Online Appendix.
In Table 3 about one third (eleven) of the teams exhibit positive and statistically significant (5%
error rate) estimated peer-effects (λrr). After Milwaukee, Detroit (DET) has the second largest positive
and significant peer-effect (0.036). The smallest positive and significant peer-effect is Houston (HOU)
at 0.023, and only slightly better were Phoenix (PHX) and Portland (POR), tied at 0.0026. Of the
eleven teams with positive and significant peer-effects, seven were in the East Conference and only
four in the West Conference. The division with the most positive and significant peer-effects (three) is
the Central Division: Cleveland (CLE), Detroit (DET) and Miluakee (MIL). Only two teams exhibit
negative and significant peer-effects, Philadelphia (PHI −0.028) and Miami (MIA, −0.027), both in
the East Conference. Finally, the bootstrap finite sample correction tended to reduce the magnitude
of the peer-effects (team chemistries), while its effect on the competitor-effects was ambiguous.
Turing to the competitor-effects (λrk), the first row of Table 3 contains results for the Toronto
Raptors (TOR). Their results are read as follows. When Toronto plays Boston (BOS), the competitor-
effect of Boston on Toronto’s performance is −0.272. That is, when these two teams meet, Boston’s
team chemistry decreases the Wins Produced performance of individual Toronto players on average.
Looking across the row, we see that the Knicks (NYK) increase Toronto’s performance (0.557). Finally,
Brooklyn’s (BKN, -0.159) and Philadelphia’s (PHI, -0.041) team chemistries diminish the performance
of Toronto. However, only the Knicks’ competitor-effect is statistically significant. Looking at the
second row, we see that Toronto enhances the play of Boston 0.280. The largest competitor effect is
Atlanta’s (ATL) effect on Charlotte (CHA) at−0.726, and the second largest is that of Cleveland (CLE)
on Milwaulkee (MIL) at −0.707. Not surprisingly, when team A enhances the individual play of team
B, team B almost always makes team A play worse. This is reflected in the signs changing around
43The same holds for the coefficients on the exogenous variables: they do not reflect the marginal effects of the
exogenous variables under consideration, but they give us insight into the relative magnitudes of the marginal effects
within and across teams.
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the diagonal in each divisional matrix. Of course these are estimates of the structural parameters.
See the Online appendix for presentation and discussion of reduced-form estimates of the peer- and
competitor-effects, and other coefficient estimates from the outcome function in (2).
Adapting and extending the spatial auto-regression (SAR) model, we develop a network competition
model, allowing estimation of both within-network effects (peer-effects) and cross-network interaction
effects (competitor-effects). The estimates provide a more complete picture of market interactions,
which may be useful in understanding and predicting how exogenous shocks to a single network trans-
late to an entire market. We apply our network competition model to 30 teams in the 2015-16 NBA
regular season and find evidence of mostly positive peer-effects (team chemistry). We find both positive
and negative competitor-effects (team rivalries). That is, teams with good network play may enhance
or diminish the performance of opposing teams. The model is somewhat restrictive relative to other
simultaneous SAR models in the literature, so future research should explore generalization of the basic
model. For example, inclusion of exogenous network effects (e.g., WrrtX1t) in the outcome function
should be considered, as should time and/or cross-sectional dependence in its error, urt (relaxation
of Assumption 1). It may also prove fruitful to explore formulation of managerial selection bias that
varies across peers within a network (relaxation of Assumption 5). For our NBA application it may
be interesting to develop peer-effect weighting schemes based on passing and ball sharing.
5. Conclusions
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Tables
Table 1: Simulated Estimation of Network Peer-Effects & Competitor-Effects
Selection Bias Corrected Estimates
{nr, T}
No Bias Corrections
{5,500} {10,1000}
Selection Bias Correction Only
{5,500} {5,1000} {10,500} {10,1000}
Bootstrap Correction
{5,500} {5,1000}
λ11 = 0.4
0.6451
(0.0138)
〈0.2455〉
0.7598
(0.0075)
〈0.3598〉
0.4178
(0.0192)
〈0.0262〉
0.4176
(0.0140)
〈0.0225〉
0.4011
(0.0215)
〈0.0216〉
0.4005
(0.0159)
〈0.0159〉
0.4002
(0.0203)
〈0.0203〉
0.4007
(0.0139)
〈0.0139〉
λ12 = −0.2
-0.1113
(0.0189)
〈0.0907〉
-0.0719
(0.0099)
〈0.1285〉
-0.1945
(0.0275)
〈0.0280〉
-0.1942
(0.0189)
〈0.0198〉
-0.2001
(0.0285)
〈0.0285〉
-0.2011
(0.0193)
〈0.0194〉
-0.2003
(0.0275)
〈0.0275〉
-0.1990
(0.0184)
〈0.0184〉
λ13 = 0.1
0.0541
(0.0159)
〈0.0486〉
0.0357
(0.0084)
〈0.0649〉
0.0936
(0.0258)
〈0.0266〉
0.0941
(0.0188)
〈0.0197〉
0.0996
(0.0276)
〈0.0276〉
0.1006
(0.0192)
〈0.0192〉
0.0998
(0.0260)
〈0.0260〉
0.0978
(0.0184)
〈0.0186〉
λ21 = 0.2
0.1274
(0.0148)
〈0.0740〉
0.0862
(0.0079)
〈0.1141〉
0.1914
(0.0258)
〈0.0272〉
0.1925
(0.0183)
〈0.0198〉
0.1997
(0.0275)
〈0.0275〉
0.1996
(0.0198)
〈0.0198〉
0.2005
(0.0261)
〈0.0261〉
0.2014
(0.0196)
〈0.0197〉
λ22 = 0.0
0.3276
(0.0187)
〈0.3282〉
0.5165
(0.0138)
〈0.5166〉
0.0126
(0.0214)
〈0.0249〉
0.0123
(0.0149)
〈0.0193〉
0.0004
(0.0205)
〈0.0205〉
0.0014
(0.0147)
〈0.0147〉
0.0000
(0.0224)
〈0.0224〉
-0.0002
(0.0151)
〈0.0151〉
λ23 = 0.0
0.0032
(0.0181)
〈0.0184〉
0.0024
(0.0093)
〈0.0096〉
-0.0119
(0.0268)
〈0.0293〉
-0.0121
(0.0194)
〈0.0229〉
-0.0152
(0.0299)
〈0.0336〉
-0.0161
(0.0209)
〈0.0264〉
0.0010
(0.0279)
〈0.0280〉
0.0003
(0.0195)
〈0.0195〉
λ31 = −0.1
-0.0595
(0.0137)
〈0.0428〉
-0.0392
(0.0074)
〈0.0612〉
-0.0958
(0.0257)
〈0.0260〉
-0.0954
(0.0179)
〈0.0185〉
-0.1021
(0.0283)
〈0.0284〉
-0.1031
(0.0203)
〈0.0206〉
-0.1005
(0.0236)
〈0.0236〉
-0.0977
(0.0172)
〈0.0173〉
λ32 = 0.0
0.0016
(0.0200)
〈0.0200〉
0.0013
(0.0106)
〈0.0107〉
0.0058
(0.0274)
〈0.0280〉
0.0045
(0.0189)
〈0.0195〉
0.0064
(0.0276)
〈0.0283〉
0.0051
(0.0194)
〈0.0200〉
-0.0025
(0.0266)
〈0.0267〉
0.0001
(0.0190)
〈0.0190〉
λ33 = 0.2
0.4987
(0.0163)
〈0.2991〉
0.6526
(0.0114)
〈0.4527〉
0.2151
(0.0209)
〈0.0258〉
0.2171
(0.0148)
〈0.0226 〉
0.2012
(0.0219)
〈0.0219〉
0.2004
(0.0159)
〈0.0159〉
0.1986
(0.0204)
〈0.0204〉
0.1984
(0.0150)
〈0.0150〉
For each parameter λrk we report the mean, the (Standard Deviation), and the 〈RMSE〉 over 1,000 simulated
draws. Two types of bias correction employed: Selection Bias Correction (columns 4-9) and Bootstrap Finite
Sample Bias Correction (columns 8 and 9)
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Table 3: Network Peer-Effect (λrr) and Competitor-Effect (λrk) Estimates within Division
EAST CONFERENCE
Atlantic Division t-statistics
TOR BOS NYK BKN PHI TOR BOS NYK BKN PHI
TOR 0.013 -0.229 0.557 -0.159 -0.041 1.107 -1.361 3.026 -0.928 -0.270
BOS 0.280 0.013 -0.652 0.569 -0.524 1.604 1.110 -4.785 5.405 -3.336
NYK -0.254 0.490 0.031 -0.330 0.200 -1.770 4.258 2.570 -2.074 1.319
BKN -0.007 -0.524 0.368 0.034 -0.331 -0.049 -4.858 2.400 2.626 -2.822
PHI 0.060 0.245 -0.189 0.443 -0.028 0.373 2.005 -1.259 3.533 -2.468
Central Division t-statistics
CLE IND DET CHI MIL CLE IND DET CHI MIL
CLE 0.029 0.272 -0.480 -0.383 0.814 2.476 1.427 -3.436 -3.814 5.801
IND -0.346 -0.018 0.332 -0.250 0.129 -1.575 -1.527 2.228 -1.175 0.965
DET 0.498 -0.523 0.036 -0.369 -0.761 3.340 -2.794 2.739 -1.557 -5.295
CHI 0.532 0.207 0.182 0.017 -0.569 3.743 0.818 0.991 1.144 -2.937
MIL -0.707 -0.234 0.635 0.420 0.044 -5.763 -1.482 4.759 2.512 3.306
Southeast Division t-statistics
MIA ATL CHA WAS ORL MIA ATL CHA WAS ORL
MIA -0.027 -0.016 0.099 -0.201 -0.092 -2.265 -0.087 0.695 -1.483 -0.577
ATL -0.099 -0.009 0.417 0.576 -0.296 -0.517 -0.761 3.188 4.642 -1.715
CHA -0.062 -0.726 0.028 -0.034 0.832 -0.333 -4.191 2.206 -0.188 5.429
WAS 0.151 -0.387 0.057 0.007 -0.183 1.059 -3.405 0.338 0.606 -1.014
ORL 0.434 0.355 -0.563 0.266 0.029 2.069 2.165 -4.599 1.187 2.061
WEST CONFERENCE
Northwest Division t-statistics
OKC POR UTA DEN MIN OKC POR UTA DEN MIN
OKC 0.013 0.066 0.381 -0.452 0.122 1.135 0.461 2.442 -2.445 0.752
POR 0.034 0.024 0.245 -0.240 -0.385 0.262 2.011 2.087 -1.425 -2.264
UTA -0.305 -0.184 0.014 0.591 0.018 -2.082 -1.213 1.155 4.367 0.111
DEN 0.160 0.137 -0.542 -0.018 -0.185 1.309 0.800 -4.831 -1.482 -0.853
MIN -0.139 0.359 0.175 0.073 0.013 -0.705 1.979 1.096 0.302 0.979
Pacific Division t-statistics
GSW LAC SAC PHX LAL GSW LAC SAC PHX LAL
GSW -0.011 0.026 -0.192 -0.587 -0.294 -0.952 0.099 -0.999 -3.083 -1.197
LAC 0.036 -0.013 0.159 0.064 -0.226 0.138 -1.156 0.805 0.465 -0.863
SAC -0.006 -0.214 0.026 -0.499 0.423 -0.035 -0.854 2.029 -3.886 2.761
PHX 0.347 -0.109 0.509 0.024 0.575 2.251 -0.803 3.850 2.007 2.214
LAL 0.327 0.220 -0.296 -0.359 0.007 1.444 0.845 -2.262 -1.802 0.534
Southwest Division t-statistics
SAS DAL MEM HOU NOP SAS DAL MEM HOU NOP
SAS 0.013 0.331 0.064 -0.134 0.416 0.939 2.517 0.277 -0.904 2.295
DAL -0.424 -0.018 0.115 0.444 -0.425 -3.371 -1.566 0.636 3.647 -3.118
MEM -0.037 -0.055 0.025 0.029 0.069 -0.148 -0.294 1.709 0.122 0.395
HOU 0.266 -0.349 0.152 0.023 0.445 1.967 -2.929 0.467 2.009 3.139
NOP -0.284 0.331 0.016 -0.447 -0.015 -1.884 2.632 0.111 -3.617 -1.300
This is a subset of results from estimation of the complete model.
The interaction map for the entire league is available from the authors by request.
Estimates include finite sample bootstrap bias correction.
Asymptotic standard errors and t-statistics.
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Online Appendix: Network Competition and Team Chemistry in the NBA
A Sufficient Conditions for Identification of Λ0 and β1,0
Proposition 1. Let Λ0 and β1,0 be the true parameter values. Let Ξr be a nr ×N matrix consisting
of R horizontally concatenated blocks of size nr, with Inr in the r
th position and zeroes in the other
R − 1 positions. Hence, Ξ1 = (In1 ,0), ΞR = (0, InR), and Ξr = (0, Inr ,0) for r 6= 1, R, where
the 0 matrices are appropriately conformable. Suppressing t, let Θrk = ΞrGrkS
−1
0 X1β1,0 and S0 =
IN −
∑R
r=1
∑R
k=1 λrk0Grk. Then, the true parameters Λ0 and β1,0 for the system of equation 3 (in
the main text) can be identified if the R matrices [QrX1r,QrΘr1, ...,QrΘrR], r = 1, ..., R have full
column rank.
Proof. As S−10 = IN +
∑R
r=1
∑R
k=1 λrk0GrkS
−1
0 and JQy = JQS
−1
0 X1β1,0 + JQS
−1
0 u
∗,44 equation 3
(in the main text) evaluated at the true parameters is written as
JQy = JQX1β1,0 + JQ
R∑
r=1
R∑
k=1
λrk0GrkS
−1
0 X1β1,0 + JQS
−1
0 u
∗ (16)
Then, Λ0 and β1,0 in (16) will be identified as long as the R matrices [QrX1r,QrΘr1, ...,QrΘrR],
r = 1, ..., R have full column rank. This condition will be generally satisfied because we have multiple
sets of network matrices and exogenous regressors for each group, which produces enough variation to
identify Λ0 and β1,0. 
B The Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Function
Suppressing t, the likelihood function for equation 5 (in the main text) is 45
lnL(Λ,β1,Σ) =−
R∑
r=1
nr − 1
2
ln(2πσ2r) + ln |S̄(Λ)| −
R∑
r=1
ε̄r(θr)
′
ε̄r(θr)
2σ2r
, (17)
where Λ = (Λ
′
1, ...,Λ
′
R)
′
with Λr = (λr1, ..., λrR), Σ = Diag(σ
2
1 , ..., σ
2
R), S̄(Λ) = IN−
∑R
r=1
∑R
k=1 λrkḠrk,
and ε̄r(θr) = ȳr−
∑R
k=1 λrkW̄rkȳk−X̄1rβ1r where θr = (Λr,β1r) and ε̄r is a vector function of θr, and
W̄rk and X̄1r are defined similarly. From Lemma 1 below, we show ln |S̄(Λ)| = − ln f(Λ) + ln |S(Λ)|
44Note that JQGrkJQ = JQGrk ∀ r,k which leads to JQS−10 JQ = JQS
−1
0
45The likelihood is conditional on the sufficient statistic, the mean of yr. Lee (2007a).
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∑R ∑R
where S(Λ) = IN − r=1 k=1 λrkGrk and f is some scalar function of Λ. For example, when R = 2,
f(Λ) = (1 − λ11)(1 − λ22) − λ12λ21, and when R = 3, f(Λ) = (1 − λ11)(1 − λ22)(1 − λ33) − (1 −
λ11)λ23λ32 − (1 − λ22)λ13λ31 − (1 − λ33)λ21λ12 − λ13λ21λ32. Using this result, we can evaluate the
likelihood without Pr as
∑R ∑R ′nr − 1 2 εr(θr)Qrεr(θr)lnL(Λ,β1,Σ) =− ln(2πσr)− ln f(Λ) + ln |S(Λ)| − , (18)2 2σ2rr=1 r=1
∑R
where εr(θr) = yr − k=1 λrkWrkyk −X1rβ1r. There are two things to note here. First, we may
need to further restrict the parameter space of Λ to guarantee that f(Λ) is strictly positive. Second,
it may be difficult to evaluate |S(Λ)|. The Ord (1975) eigenvalue device may be used to compute the
determinant. However, it may only work when the number of networks R is small, and all the network
matrices are sparse. If the number of networks R is large, then GMM may be preferred to QML, as it
avoids the computational difficulties of evaluating the determinant of S.
To simplify estimation, we concentrate out β1 and Σ in (18). The QML estimate of β1r and σ
2
r ,
′ ′ ∑ˆ Rgiven Λr is β −11r(Λr) = (X1rQrX1r) X1rQrµr(Λr) where µr(Λr) = yr− k=1 λrkWrkyk is a vector
function, and
′ ′ ′ ′
2 εr(θr)Qrεr(θr) µ (Λ ) [Q −Q X (X Q −1r r r r 1r rX1r) X Qr]µr(Λr)σ̂r (Λr) = = 1r 1r , (19)
nr − 1 nr − 1
is a scalar function. Then the concentrated log-likelihood function in Λ is
∑R ∑R
c nr − 1 nr − 1lnL (Λ) = − [ln(2π) + 1]− ln f(Λ) + ln |S(Λ)| − ln σ̂ 2r (Λr). (20)
2 2
r=1 r=1
ˆ ˆ ˆThen the QMLE, Λ, is the maximizer of the likelihood, and the QMLE of β1 and Σ are β1r(Λr)
2 ˆ 2 ˆand Diag(σ̂1(Λ1), ..., σ̂R(ΛR)), respectively. The asymptotic distribution for these estimators can
be derived from Lee et al. (2010, Appendix B) with appropriate modifications. When nr is small,
the simulation study in section 3 (of the main text) uncovers a sizable finite sample bias for the QML
estimator of Λ, which persists even as T increases. To remove the bias, we propose a residual bootstrap
finite sample correction in section 3 (of the main text).
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C Lemma 1
This generalizes a similar result in Lemma C.1 of Lee at al. (2010) to our setting with multiple networks
and heterogeneous network effects.
√
Lemma 1. Suppressing t, let the orthonormal matrix of Qr be [Pr, ιnr/ nr]. The columns in Pr
′ ′
are eigenvectors of Qr corresponding to the eigenvalue one, such that Prιnr = 0, PrPr = Inr−1 and
′ ′ ′ ′ ¯ ′ ¯PrPr = Qr. Denote J |P = Diag(P1, ...,PR) and Grk = JPGrkJP , then, ln S(Λ)| = − ln f(Λ) +∑
| ¯ R
∑R ∑ R
ln S(Λ)| ¯ R
∑
where S(Λ) = IN−R − r=1 k=1 λrkGrk, S(Λ) = IN − r=1 k=1 λrkGrk and f(Λ) is
some function of Λ.
Proof. Here, we show that the Lemma holds for two networks. From this, we can easily see that
ι[P , n√ 11 ] 0n  ′
the Lemma holds generally. Define H =  1 . Then, we can show that |H (I −
ιn√ 20 [P2, n2∑2
r=1
∑2
k=1 λrkGrk)H| = |H
′
H||I−
∑2
r=1
∑2
k=1 λrkGrk| = |IN −
∑2
r=1
∑2
k=1 λrkGrk| as |H
′
H| = 1.
Next, we show
H
′
(IN −
2∑
r=1
2∑
k=1
λrkGrk)H =
[P1, ιn1√n1 ]′ 0
0 [P2,
ιn2√
n2
]
′

In1 − λ11W11 −λ12W12
−λ21W21 In2 − λ22W22

[P1, ι1√n1 ] 0
0 [P2,
ι2√
n2
]
 .
(21)
Now, P
′
rWrkιnk = 0 and ι
′
nrWrkιnk = nr. Hence,
H
′
(IN −
2∑
r=1
2∑
k=1
λrkGrk)H =

P
′
1(In1 − λ11W11)P1 0 −λ12P
′
1W12P2 0
ι
′
n1√
n1
(In1 − λ11W11)P1 1− λ11
ι
′
n1√
n1
(−λ12W12)P2 −
√
n1
n2
λ12
−λ21P
′
2W21P1 0 P
′
2(In2 − λ22W22)P2 0
ι
′
n2√
n2
(−λ21W21)P1 −
√
n2
n1
λ21
ι
′
n2√
n2
(In2 − λ22W22)P2 1− λ22

(22)
]
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Then, from Laplace’s formula,
|H
′
(IN −
2∑
r=1
2∑
k=1
λrkGrk)H|
= (1− λ11)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P
′
1(In1 − λ11W11)P1 −λ12P
′
1W12P2 0
−λ21P
′
2W21P1 P
′
2(In2 − λ22W22)P2 0
ι
′
n2√
n2
(−λ21W21)P1
ι
′
n2√
n2
(In2 − λ22W22)P2 1− λ22
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
+ (−1)n2(−
√
n2
n1
λ21)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P
′
1(In1 − λ11W11)P1 −λ12P
′
1W12P2 0
ι
′
n1√
n1
(In1 − λ11W11)P1
ι
′
n1√
n1
(−λ12W12)P2 −
√
n1
n2
λ12
−λ21P
′
2W21P1 P
′
2(In2 − λ22W22)P2 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= (1− λ11)(1− λ22)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P
′
1(In1 − λ11W11)P1 −λ12P
′
1W12P2
−λ21P
′
2W21P1 P
′
2(In2 − λ22W22)P2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
− λ12λ21
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P
′
1(In1 − λ11W11)P1 −λ12P
′
1W12P2
−λ21P
′
2W21P1 P
′
2(In2 − λ22W22)P2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
(
(1− λ11)(1− λ22)− λ12λ21
) ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
P
′
1(In1 − λ11W11)P1 −λ12P
′
1W12P2
−λ21P
′
2W21P1 P
′
2(In2 − λ22W22)P2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣︸ ︷︷ ︸
#
(23)
′ ∑2 ∑2 ∑2 ∑2 ¯Now, the determinant # is equal to |J (IN − λrkGrk)JP | = |IN−2− λrkGrk|P r=1 k=1 r=1 k=1 ,( )∑2 ∑2 ∑2 ∑2
implying that |IN − ¯r=1 k=1 λrkGrk| = (1−λ11)(1−λ22)−λ12λ21 |IN−2− r=1 k=1 λrkGrk|.
Therefore, the Lemma holds for the R = 2 case. From this, we can easily see that the Lemma holds for
any number of networks. For example, when there are R = 3 networks, f(Λ) = (1− λ11)(1− λ22)(1−
λ33)− (1− λ11)λ23λ32 − (1− λ22)λ13λ31 − (1− λ33)λ21λ12 − λ13λ21λ32. 
D Additional Simulated Results
To save space Table 2 (in the main text) contains selected results for the four DGPs defined in section
3 of the main text. In particular, Table 2 provides simulated results for estimation of network-level
coefficients for only two sample sizes: {nr, T} = {5, 500} and = {5, 1000}, using two ways to estimate
the selection probabilities: Multinomial Logit (MLN) and 5-fold cross-validated Random Forest (RF).
Here, we provide additional results for intermediate sample size, {nr, T} = {10, 500}, and an additional
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estimator of the selection probabilities: out-of-bag tuned RF. Table 4 provides the results for all three
sample sizes for MNL estimation of the probabilities. Table 5 provides the results for both the 5-fold
cross-validated and out-of-bag tuned RF (described below). Therefore, Table 2 (in the main text)
provides a subset of the results in Tables 4 and 5 below. For comparison purposes, Table 6 provides
the results for RF with no tuning.
We consider two ways of tuning the maximum number of splits in a tree. The first method is
based on the out-of-bag (OOB) classification error. RF is a bagging method which grows trees on
bootstrapped subsets of the observations. On average, around two-third of the observations are used
to fit a tree, so the remaining observations can be used to calculate an out-of-sample classification
error by excluding the trees grown on bootstraps that include observation i when computing the ith
observation’s prediction. This is computationally easiest but may be subject to overfitting because the
OOB error is similar to a leave-one-out cross-validation error when the number of trees grown is large
(James et al., 2017). The second method uses five-fold cross-validation in which the data are divided
into five subsets of similar size. This method is more computational intensive, but may be less subject
to overfitting, as each possible subset is used as a test set in alternation and is validated against the
complement of the subset. For comparison, we consider RF without tuning where we grow 1,000 trees
with a maximum number of splits = T − 1.
In almost all cases, Tables 4 and 5 show that RF with five-fold cross-validation performs best in
terms of both bias and variance of the estimates. When it is not tuned (Table 6), the bias of RF is
as large as that of MNL, even in DGP 3 and 4 (Table 4). This result aligns well with the findings in
Scornet et al. (2015) and Wager and Walther (2015) that the depth of the trees (i.e. the number of
splits in a tree) should be controlled to eliminate bias from the inherent data-dependent procedures
in growing trees. Wager and Athey (2018, Appendix B) explain that the bias may be due to the fact
that RF tends to push outliers into corners of features space. Minimizing this sort of bias by a proper
tuning of the number of splits may be important in our context as selection bias can only be corrected
when outliers are correctly identified. The result may provide practical guidance on the selection of
the maximum number of splits that satisfies the theoretical condition on depth of a decision tree for
the consistency of random forest in Scornet et al. (2015) and Wager and Walther (2015).
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E NBA Data and Additional Empirical Results
Descriptive statistics for the variables in the outcome and selection equations are in Tables 7 and 8. The
first columns contain the abbreviated names of the 30 NBA teams, which are partitioned by division
(e.g., Atlantic Division of the East Conference) and ranked within division by the mean of our outcome
variable, Wins (second column), which is measured as Wins Produced per minute. For example, in the
2015-16 season Cleveland (CLE) had an average Wins Produced per minute of 0.0066 (second column)
with a standard deviation of 0.0264 (third column). Cleveland played in 1,883 sampled time periods
(column heading Periods) with an average duration of 1.7611 minutes per period (column heading
ADP =average duration per period). Over short time intervals player-time level Wins Produced can
be highly variable and sometimes quite small (non-pivotal) due to many zeros in the box score. During
this season, the Golden State Warriors (GSW) had the highest Wins Produced per minute (0.0081)
and Philadelphia (PHI) had the lowest (0.0051). Not surprisingly, the Warriors won the most games
that season (72) and Philadelphia the fewest (10). Therefore, if the goal is to win games, then our
outcome measure seems appropriate for these data.
Rounding out Table 7 are the explanatory variables in the outcome equation. As previously stated,
Experience is the cumulative minutes played by a player from the beginning of the game to the end
of period t − 1. The Fatigue variable is total minutes continuously played by the player at the end
of period t − 1. For example, Milwaukee (MIL) had values of experience and fatigue of 14.3271 and
5.5877 minutes, respectively. The Milwaukee cagers play many minutes (on average), and many of
these minutes are continuous, compared to other teams in the league. Philadelphia (PHI) had the
lowest values for the experience variable, while Atlanta (ATL) had the lowest fatigue variable. It is
likely that these coaches substitute many players more frequently than the rest of the league. This is
reflected in their relatively low values for “Average Duration per Period” (ADP ) of 1.6193 minutes
(PHI) and 1.6391 minutes (ATL). The RPI variable is “Ratings Percentage Index” and is a measure
of the opposing team’s power rating at the end of the previous season.46 Higher ratings reflect tougher
opposing teams, so Phoenix (PHX) faced the toughest schedule (RPI = 0.5028) during the 2015-16
season, based on power ratings at the end of the 2014-15 season.
Table 8 contains means and standard deviations for the variables in the selection equation. The
second column contains dependent variable (Nguard), and we see that the Portland coach (POR) uses
on average the most guards (2.5), while Chicago (CHI) uses the fewest (1.44). This is not surprising
46The RPI for each opposing team is obtained from ESPN: http://www.espn.com/nba/stats/rpi/year/2015.
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given that Portland averaged the most guards on their roster (NguradR = 4.98) in any game and
Chicago had the fewest (NguradR = 3.14). The Golden State Warriors (GSW) had the largest
positive cumulative score differential CumscoreDiff =6.62, while Philadelphia (PHI) had the largest
negative score differential (-6.03). Golden State tended to be leading in points over the season, while
Philadelphia was often losing. This is also not surprising given their best and worst (respectively)
records at the end of the season. Boston (BOS) had the largest number of cumulative fouls over a
game (CumFoul = 11.20) and the San Antonio Spurs (SAS) had the fewest (8.54 fouls).
The reduced form of equation 15 (in the main text) provides insight onto the overall network effects
in the production process. Suppressing subscripts, the matrix form of equation 15 is,
y = M · y + XB + u,
where y =
[ yrtg
yktg
]
, a 10× 1 vector, and M =
[
λrrWrrtg λrkWrktg
λkrWkrtg λkkWkktg
]
, a 10× 10 network matrix. Solving
for the reduced form and taking expectations conditional on X yields
E(y|X) = (I10 −M)−1XB. (24)
This implies that the reduced-form peer- and competitor-effects are polynomial functions of the struc-
tural peer- and competitor-effects of any head-to-head match-up. For example, the second-order
network term, M2, is given by
M2 =
[
λrrWrrtg λrkWrktg
λkrWkrtg λkkWkktg
] [
λrrWrrtg λrkWrktg
λkrWkrtg λkkWkktg
]
= [ m1 m2m3 m4 ]
where
m1 = (λrrWrrtg)
2 + λrkλkrWrktgWkrtg
m2 = λrrλrkWrrtgWrktg + λkkλrkWkktgWrktg
m3 = λrrλkrWrrtgWkrtg + λkkλkrWkktgWkrtg
m4 = (λkkWkktg)
2 + λrkλkrWrktgWkrtg
The first component of m1 represents the second-order, pure peer-effect of team r on itself (r →
r → r). The second component of m1 represents the competitor-effect that arises from the fact
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that r’s performance affects k’s performance but it feeds back to r through the competitor network
(r → k → r). The first component of m2 represents a mixed effect that arise from the fact that k
affects r’s performance which, in turn, affects r again through its own peer network (k → r → r). The
second component of m2 represents a mixed effect that arises from the enhanced performance due to
the network effect of team k that is affecting team r’s performance through the competition network
(k → k → r). Terms m3 and m4 can be similarly understood, but from the perspective of team k.
We calculate the 10×10 reduced-form matrix (I −110−M) in (24) for every network in each period t
for every r vs. k match-up over the season. Since the elements of the upper, right-hand 5×5 submatrix
of (I10−M)−1 capture the competitor-effect from k to r for each of the 5 players on team r, we report
the average of the row-sums of the submatrices for every period for every match-up of team r vs. k
over the season. This average embodies a reduced-form “indirect competitor-effect” from k to r.47 We
also report the same for the lower left-hand 5×5 submatrix, which captures the competitor-effect from
r to k. These two reduced-form average effects corresponded in sign and magnitude to the structural
competitor-effects λrk and λkr within a division. Therefore, it appears that for these data the first-
order structural competitor-effects are an excellent proxy for the reduced-form competitor-effects.48
Table 9 contains the reduced-form indirect competitor-effects. We do not include t-statics for the
indirect competitor-effects, but the point of this table is to show the similarity between these results
and those of Table 3 in the main text. For example, in Table 9 the average indirect competitor-effect
of Boston (BOS) on Toronto (TOR) is −0.220, while the corresponding structural parameter in Table
3 is −0.229. In Table 9 the average indirect competitor-effect of New York (NYK) on Boston (BOC)
is −0.508, while the corresponding structural parameter in Table 3 is −0.569. Results are similar
for other match-ups, as well. Apparently, the reduced-form competitor-effects are largely determined
by the first-order effect, which consists solely of the structural parameter, λrk, so we would not be
making a grave error if we interpreted the structural competitor-effects in Table 3 as reduced-form
indirect competitor-effects. We also experimented with a “direct” and “indirect own network effect” by
calculating the average of the diagonal elements and the row-sums, but without the diagonal elements,
respectively, of the 5 × 5 upper left-hand corner submatrix of the matrix (I10 −M)−1 over all time
periods for the games played between teams r and k within a division. We found that this average
was affected by the relative signs of λrk and λkr. If the signs were the same, then it increased the
47This is similar to the direct and indirect reduced-form spatial effects discussed in LeSage and Pace (2009) and Elhorst
(2014). See Glass et al. (2016), Table 5 for an example.
48In fact, we find that any row sum of the upper, right-hand 5 × 5 submatrix approximately equals the competitor
coefficient, λrk, which we believe is due to the topology of the competition matrix.
41
average effect, but if the signs were different, then this effect was smaller. The point is that without
accounting for the competitor-effects (which the literature has often overlooked) the within network
effects may not be accurately measured.
In Table 3 (of the main text) the sign of the estimated λrk is almost always the opposite of
the sign of the estimated λkr, which makes sense from a competitive standpoint, but the 120 intra-
divisional estimates are numerous and difficult to interpret on their own. Therefore, we also report
the 60 products, λrkλkr, which appears in both m1 and m4 of the second-order network effect, of the
reduced-form matrix (I −10 −M) 1. This is only a partial structural effect, but it provides an easier
way to simultaneously summarize the competitor-effects for both teams in any match-up between r
and k than the individual competitor-effects alone. It is a single statistic that captures (in some
sense) the intensity of the rivalry between r and k (and vice versa) after controlling for individual
performance, within-team chemistry and coaching. These statistics should be particularly relevant
for quantifying intensity of intra-divisional rivalry.49 These are tabulated in Table 10. For example,
consider the Toronto Raptors (TOR) in the first row. The signs and the relative magnitudes of the
competitor-effect products suggest that the New York Knicks (NYK) are a much tougher opponent for
Toronto (−0.141) than is Boston (−0.064). The “toughest” match-up in the Atlantic division in terms
of competitor-effects is New York vs. Boston, where the product of the competitor-effects is largest in
magnitude in the division (−0.319). Looking down the rows of the table, the toughest match-ups in
each division in terms of competitor-effects are: CLE-MIL (−0.575) in the Central Division, CHA-ORL
(−0.468) in the Southeast, UTA-DEN (−0.320) in the Northwest, PHX-LAL (−0.206) in the Pacific,
and HOU-NOP (−0.199) in the Southwest.
Estimates of β1r, estimates of β2r and the coefficient on the selection bias based on Lee’s approach,
and estimates of β2r based on Dahl’s approach are in Table 11, 12 and 13, respectively. An interesting
result in Table 12 is that the coefficient on the selection bias term in the final-step estimates is almost
always insignificant, using Lee’s approach. Therefore, either the selection model is poorly specified or
NBA coaches had little strategic effect on player productivity after accounting for peer- and competitor-
effects in the 2015-16 season. Only the LA Clippers (LAC in the MNL model) and the LA Lakers
(LAL in the RF model) had significant coach selection effects at the 95% significance level.
49We use the delta method to calculate standard errors of the competitor-effects products.
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Table 4: Simulated Estimation of Network-Level Coefficients: MNL
No Bias Term
MNL
Lee Dahl
{nr, T} β2(0) β2(1) β2(2) β2(0) β2(1) β2(2) ρ β2(1) β2(2)
DGP1: Lee + Linear Utility Function
Bias -1.40 -0.32 0.51 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.10 0.12
SD 0.20 0.27 0.29 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.16 0.42 0.46
{5, 500} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.19 0.27 0.28
1.42 0.42 0.59
0.23 0.25
0.23 0.25
0.25
0.25
0.16
0.17
0.44
0.57
0.47
0.58
95% Coverage Rate 0.00 0.78 0.54 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.99 0.99
Bias -1.40 -0.33 0.51 -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.08 0.11
SD 0.19 0.27 0.26 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.16 0.43 0.43
{10, 500} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.19
1.41
0.27
0.43
0.27
0.57
0.22
0.23
0.24
0.24
0.24
0.24
0.16
0.17
0.43
0.57
0.45
0.55
95% Coverage Rate 0.00 0.76 0.54 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.99 0.99
Bias -1.40 -0.34 0.50 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.09
SD 0.15 0.20 0.22 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.36 0.34
{5, 1000} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.14
1.41
0.19
0.39
0.20
0.55
0.17
0.16
0.18
0.18
0.18
0.18
0.13
0.11
0.40
0.37
0.39
0.35
95% Coverage Rate 0.00 0.59 0.26 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.98
DGP2: Dahl + Linear Utility Function
Bias -1.48 -0.45 0.67 -0.41 -0.20 0.30 0.40 -0.03 0.12
SD 0.20 0.28 0.31 0.23 0.28 0.28 0.13 0.42 0.34
{5, 500} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.20 0.28 0.29
1.49 0.53 0.74
0.23 0.27
0.47 0.35
0.27
0.41
0.14
0.42
0.50
0.42
0.47
0.36
95% Coverage Rate 0.00 0.67 0.36 0.57 0.87 0.80 0.21 0.99 0.99
Bias -1.47 -0.47 0.67 -0.42 -0.21 0.30 0.40 -0.04 0.11
SD 0.19 0.28 0.29 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.13 0.33 0.31
{10, 500} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.19
1.48
0.28
0.54
0.28
0.73
0.23
0.48
0.26
0.34
0.26
0.40
0.13
0.42
0.47
0.33
0.44
0.33
95% Coverage Rate 0.00 0.59 0.34 0.54 0.85 0.80 0.15 0.99 0.99
Bias -1.47 -0.46 0.67 -0.42 -0.20 0.30 0.40 0.00 0.07
SD 0.15 0.22 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.09 0.25 0.24
{5, 1000} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.14
1.48
0.20
0.51
0.21
0.71
0.17
0.45
0.19
0.28
0.19
0.35
0.11
0.41
0.33
0.25
0.31
0.25
95% Coverage Rate 0.00 0.36 0.10 0.28 0.81 0.67 0.03 0.99 0.99
DGP3: Lee + Nonlinear Utility Function
Bias -2.07 0.77 0.75 -0.16 0.17 0.18 0.06 0.16 0.17
SD 0.17 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.19 0.29 0.29
{5, 500} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.17 0.30 0.30
2.08 0.82 0.81
0.27 0.27
0.31 0.32
0.27
0.33
0.19
0.19
0.29
0.33
0.30
0.34
95% Coverage Rate 0.00 0.25 0.30 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.93 0.92 0.92
Bias -2.07 0.76 0.75 -0.16 0.20 0.18 0.05 0.19 0.18
SD 0.19 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.19 0.28 0.28
{10, 500} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.17
2.08
0.29
0.81
0.29
0.80
0.27
0.32
0.26
0.33
0.26
0.31
0.18
0.19
0.29
0.34
0.29
0.33
95% Coverage Rate 0.00 0.26 0.26 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.92 0.91 0.91
Bias -2.07 0.76 0.76 -0.15 0.19 0.18 0.04 0.21 0.20
SD 0.13 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.13 0.21 0.21
{5, 1000} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.13
2.08
0.22
0.79
0.22
0.79
0.19
0.25
0.19
0.27
0.19
0.27
0.14
0.14
0.21
0.30
0.21
0.29
95% Coverage Rate 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.87 0.84 0.85 0.93 0.84 0.85
DGP4: Dahl + Nonlinear Utility Function
Bias -2.50 1.05 1.06 -0.83 0.57 0.56 0.27 0.49 0.49
SD 0.16 0.31 0.31 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.16 0.30 0.30
{5, 500} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.16 0.30 0.30
2.50 1.10 1.10
0.25 0.28 0.28
0.87 0.63 0.62
0.16
0.31
0.31
0.57
0.31
0.58
95% Coverage Rate 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.46 0.49 0.62 0.65 0.64
Bias -2.50 1.06 1.06 -0.83 0.57 0.56 0.27 0.49 0.48
SD 0.14 0.29 0.28 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.15 0.29 0.29
{10, 500} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.15
2.50
0.29
1.10
0.29
1.10
0.24
0.87
0.27
0.62
0.27
0.62
0.16
0.31
0.30
0.56
0.30
0.57
95% Coverage Rate 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.45 0.44 0.59 0.63 0.62
Bias -2.50 1.06 1.07 -0.81 0.55 0.56 0.25 0.48 0.49
SD 0.12 0.22 0.22 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.11 0.21 0.21
{5, 1000} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.12
2.50
0.22
1.08
0.22
1.09
0.17
0.83
0.20
0.59
0.20
0.59
0.12
0.27
0.22
0.52
0.22
0.53
95% Coverage Rate 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.18 0.45 0.39 0.36
Table 5: Simulated Estimation of Network-Level Coefficients: Random Forest
RF + Out of Bag Tuning RF + 5 Fold CV
Lee Dahl Lee Dahl
{nr, T} β2(0) β2(1) β2(2) ρ β2(1) β2(2) β2(0) β2(1) β2(2) ρ β2(1) β2(2)
DGP1: Lee + Linear Utility Function
Bias -0.12 -0.07 0.10 0.11 -0.14 0.20 -0.08 -0.06 0.07 0.04 -0.14 0.18
SD 0.31 0.27 0.29 0.26 0.32 0.36 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.19 0.32 0.34
{5, 500} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.28
0.33
0.26 0.27 0.25
0.28 0.31 0.29
0.34 0.36
0.35 0.41
0.25
0.26
0.27
0.27
0.28
0.27
0.19
0.19
0.36
0.35
0.38
0.38
95% Coverage Rate 0.89 0.93 0.90 0.89 0.94 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.96
Bias -0.11 -0.06 0.09 0.10 -0.16 0.20 -0.10 -0.06 0.09 0.05 -0.14 0.18
SD 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.23 0.31 0.32 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.18 0.31 0.31
{10, 500} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.27
0.29
0.25
0.26
0.26
0.28
0.25
0.25
0.34
0.35
0.35
0.38
0.24
0.26
0.26
0.25
0.27
0.27
0.18
0.19
0.36
0.34
0.37
0.36
95% Coverage Rate 0.90 0.94 0.92 0.91 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.96 0.96
Bias -0.07 -0.07 0.07 0.08 -0.15 0.19 -0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.03 -0.14 0.17
SD 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.13 0.24 0.25
{5, 1000} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.20
0.24
0.19
0.22
0.19
0.22
0.19
0.24
0.25
0.29
0.26
0.31
0.18
0.19
0.19
0.20
0.20
0.20
0.14
0.14
0.26
0.28
0.28
0.30
95% Coverage Rate 0.90 0.92 0.91 0.89 0.91 0.91 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.94
DGP2: Dahl + Linear Utility Function
Bias -0.50 -0.25 0.36 0.49 -0.21 0.33 -0.47 -0.23 0.35 0.42 -0.17 0.30
SD 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.20 0.33 0.36 0.24 0.29 0.28 0.15 0.32 0.33
{5, 500} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.27
0.57
0.28 0.28 0.21
0.37 0.47 0.53
0.36 0.37
0.39 0.48
0.24
0.53
0.28
0.37
0.29
0.45
0.16
0.45
0.37
0.37
0.38
0.44
95% Coverage Rate 0.52 0.84 0.74 0.35 0.92 0.85 0.50 0.85 0.76 0.28 0.94 0.91
Bias -0.49 -0.28 0.36 0.49 -0.22 0.33 -0.47 -0.25 0.35 0.43 -0.18 0.30
SD 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.19 0.32 0.34 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.15 0.32 0.33
{10, 500} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.26
0.56
0.27
0.38
0.27
0.45
0.20
0.53
0.35
0.39
0.36
0.47
0.24
0.53
0.27
0.37
0.28
0.44
0.15
0.46
0.36
0.36
0.37
0.44
95% Coverage Rate 0.51 0.83 0.74 0.31 0.94 0.86 0.49 0.84 0.76 0.18 0.95 0.90
Bias -0.45 -0.26 0.35 0.45 -0.20 0.31 -0.46 -0.23 0.34 0.42 -0.17 0.27
SD 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.14 0.26 0.26 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.11 0.25 0.26
{5, 1000} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.19
0.49
0.19
0.34
0.20
0.40
0.15
0.47
0.26
0.33
0.27
0.40
0.17
0.49
0.20
0.30
0.21
0.39
0.12
0.43
0.27
0.30
0.28
0.37
95% Coverage Rate 0.34 0.72 0.59 0.18 0.87 0.79 0.24 0.78 0.63 0.05 0.92 0.86
DGP3: Lee + Nonlinear Utility Function
Bias -0.18 0.05 0.04 0.10 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.11 -0.09
SD 0.43 0.32 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.23 0.32 0.32
{5, 500} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.44
0.47
0.33 0.33 0.36
0.32 0.33 0.35
0.38 0.38
0.35 0.36
0.30
0.31
0.29
0.30
0.29
0.29
0.21
0.23
0.35
0.34
0.35
0.33
95% Coverage Rate 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.93 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.96
Bias -0.17 0.03 0.03 0.09 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.07
SD 0.40 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.35 0.34 0.32 0.29 0.28 0.22 0.32 0.33
{10, 500} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.44
0.44
0.32
0.31
0.32
0.31
0.36
0.34
0.38
0.35
0.38
0.35
0.30
0.32
0.28
0.29
0.29
0.28
0.21
0.22
0.35
0.33
0.35
0.34
95% Coverage Rate 0.92 0.95 0.96 0.93 0.96 0.97 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.95
Bias -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.06 -0.06 0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.08 -0.09
SD 0.29 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.15 0.24 0.24
{5, 1000} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.31
0.31
0.24
0.23
0.24
0.23
0.25
0.23
0.27
0.26
0.27
0.27
0.21
0.21
0.20
0.22
0.20
0.22
0.15
0.16
0.24
0.26
0.24
0.26
95% Coverage Rate 0.92 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.92
DGP4: Dahl + Nonlinear Utility Function
Bias -0.81 0.40 0.41 0.27 0.19 0.21 -0.69 0.37 0.36 0.17 0.16 0.16
SD 0.37 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.37 0.36 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.22 0.34 0.34
{5, 500} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.39
0.89
0.32 0.32 0.33
0.51 0.52 0.41
0.38 0.38
0.42 0.42
0.28
0.74
0.29
0.47
0.29
0.47
0.20
0.27
0.36
0.37
0.36
0.38
95% Coverage Rate 0.47 0.76 0.73 0.82 0.92 0.92 0.31 0.76 0.76 0.83 0.95 0.94
Bias -0.81 0.42 0.42 0.26 0.22 0.22 -0.68 0.36 0.36 0.16 0.15 0.15
SD 0.35 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.37 0.35 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.21 0.32 0.34
{10, 500} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.40
0.88
0.31
0.52
0.31
0.51
0.34
0.40
0.38
0.43
0.38
0.41
0.27
0.74
0.28
0.46
0.28
0.46
0.19
0.27
0.35
0.35
0.35
0.37
95% Coverage Rate 0.46 0.71 0.74 0.84 0.91 0.92 0.29 0.75 0.76 0.84 0.95 0.94
Bias -0.73 0.38 0.38 0.23 0.15 0.14 -0.64 0.34 0.35 0.16 0.10 0.11
SD 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.28 0.27 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.14 0.25 0.24
{5, 1000} Avg. Bootstrap SE
RMSE
0.28
0.77
0.23
0.45
0.23
0.44
0.23
0.31
0.27
0.31
0.27
0.30
0.19
0.67
0.21
0.40
0.21
0.41
0.14
0.21
0.25
0.27
0.25
0.26
95% Coverage Rate 0.27 0.61 0.63 0.82 0.92 0.93 0.10 0.61 0.60 0.75 0.94 0.94
Table 6: Simulated Estimation of Network-Level Coefficients: RF
(No Tuning)
Lee Dahl
{nr, T} β2(0) β2(1) β2(2) ρ β2(1) β2(2)
{5, 500}
DGP1:
Bias
SD
RMSE
Lee + Linear Utility Functi
-0.43 -0.04 0.12 -1.45
0.24 0.27 0.27 0.40
0.49 0.27 0.30 1.50
on
-0.18
0.27
0.32
0.27
0.28
0.39
{10, 500}
Bias
SD
RMSE
-0.42
0.22
0.47
-0.05
0.24
0.25
0.11
0.26
0.28
-1.45
0.39
1.51
-0.19
0.25
0.31
0.26
0.26
0.36
{5, 1000}
Bias
SD
RMSE
-0.40
0.16
0.43
-0.05
0.19
0.19
0.10
0.19
0.22
-1.52
0.30
1.55
-0.19
0.19
0.27
0.26
0.20
0.33
{5, 500}
DGP2:
Bias
SD
RMSE
Dahl + Linear Utility Funct
-0.70 -0.23 0.39 -0.83
0.23 0.27 0.27 0.40
0.74 0.36 0.48 0.92
ion
-0.31
0.28
0.42
0.47
0.28
0.55
{10, 500}
Bias
SD
RMSE
-0.71
0.22
0.74
-0.23
0.28
0.36
0.36
0.27
0.45
-0.81
0.40
0.90
-0.30
0.29
0.42
0.44
0.28
0.52
{5, 1000}
Bias
SD
RMSE
-0.68
0.17
0.70
-0.23
0.20
0.30
0.36
0.20
0.41
-0.89
0.30
0.94
-0.31
0.21
0.38
0.45
0.21
0.50
{5, 500}
DGP3: L
Bias
SD
RMSE
ee + Nonlinear Utility Func
-0.59 0.21 0.22 -1.51
0.26 0.29 0.30 0.44
0.65 0.35 0.37 1.57
tion
0.23
0.29
0.37
0.24
0.30
0.39
{10, 500}
Bias
SD
RMSE
-0.60
0.24
0.65
0.20
0.27
0.34
0.21
0.26
0.33
-1.48
0.40
1.53
0.23
0.28
0.36
0.23
0.27
0.35
{5, 1000}
Bias
SD
RMSE
-0.57
0.17
0.60
0.19
0.20
0.27
0.20
0.18
0.27
-1.55
0.29
1.58
0.22
0.20
0.30
0.23
0.19
0.29
{5, 500}
DGP4: D
Bias
SD
RMSE
ahl + Nonlinear Utility Fun
-1.13 0.54 0.55 -1.23
0.24 0.28 0.28 0.40
1.16 0.61 0.61 1.29
ction
0.53
0.29
0.61
0.54
0.28
0.61
{10, 500}
Bias
SD
RMSE
-1.13
0.22
1.15
0.55
0.27
0.61
0.56
0.27
0.62
-1.25
0.37
1.31
0.53
0.28
0.60
0.54
0.28
0.61
{5, 1000}
Bias
SD
RMSE
-1.11
0.16
1.12
0.53
0.19
0.56
0.55
0.20
0.58
-1.30
0.27
1.33
0.51
0.20
0.55
0.53
0.21
0.57
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Table 9: Reduced-Form Indirect Competitor Effects within Division
East Conference
Atlantic Division
TOR BOS NYK BKN PHI
TOR - -0.220 0.507 -0.167 -0.040
BOS 0.268 - -0.508 0.451 -0.460
NYK -0.231 0.384 - -0.312 0.193
BKN -0.007 -0.415 0.344 - -0.290
PHI 0.060 0.215 -0.183 0.388 -
Central Division
CLE IND DET CHI MIL
CLE - 0.251 -0.408 -0.331 0.541
IND -0.319 - 0.288 -0.238 0.129
DET 0.424 -0.453 - -0.364 -0.542
CHI 0.459 0.197 0.180 - -0.483
MIL -0.470 -0.233 0.452 0.356 -
Southeast Division
MIA ATL CHA WAS ORL
MIA - -0.016 0.098 -0.190 -0.088
ATL -0.096 - 0.325 0.470 -0.273
CHA -0.061 -0.563 - -0.034 0.587
WAS 0.144 -0.316 0.059 - -0.180
ORL 0.419 0.327 -0.398 0.262 -
West Conference
Northwest Division
OKC POR UTA DEN MIN
OKC - 0.068 0.348 -0.423 0.123
POR 0.035 - 0.243 -0.234 -0.349
UTA -0.280 -0.182 - 0.446 0.018
DEN 0.148 0.134 -0.409 - -0.181
MIN -0.140 0.326 0.180 0.072 -
Pacific Division
GSW LAC SAC PHX LAL
GSW - 0.025 -0.195 -0.494 -0.268
LAC 0.036 - 0.156 0.064 -0.214
SAC -0.006 -0.210 - -0.414 0.387
PHX 0.292 -0.109 0.422 - 0.489
LAL 0.297 0.208 -0.271 -0.305 -
Southwest Division
SAS DAL MEM HOU NOP
SAS - 0.288 0.067 -0.134 0.370
DAL -0.370 - 0.115 0.386 -0.362
MEM -0.038 -0.055 - 0.031 0.070
HOU 0.266 -0.304 0.160 - 0.374
NOP -0.254 0.282 0.016 -0.375 -
Average Indirect effect from competitors is the average of row sum of the right-hand corner
5 × 5 submatrix of the 10 × 10 network matrix over all time periods for a given team and
opposing team.
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Table 10: Product Competitor Effect Estimates, λrkλkr, within Division
East Conference
Atlantic Division t-statistics
TOR BOS NYK BKN PHI TOR BOS NYK BKN PHI
TOR -0.064 -0.141 0.001 -0.002 -0.773 -1.196 0.051 -0.165
BOS -0.319 -0.298 -0.128 -2.516 -2.939 -1.344
NYK
BKN
-0.121 -0.038
-0.147
-1.187 -0.681
-1.717
PHI
Central Division
CLE IND DET CHI MIL CLE IND
t-statistics
DET CHI MIL
CLE -0.094 -0.239 -0.204 -0.575 -0.777 -1.862 -2.115 -3.386
IND
DET
-0.174 -0.052
-0.067
-0.030
-0.483
-1.327 -0.496
-0.628
-0.621
-2.876
CHI -0.239 -1.449
MIL
Southeast Division t-statistics
MIA ATL CHA WAS ORL MIA ATL CHA WAS ORL
MIA
ATL
0.002 -0.006
-0.302
-0.030
-0.223
-0.040
-0.105
0.101 -0.235
-1.983
-0.658
-2.186
-0.465
-1.011
CHA -0.002 -0.468 -0.126 -2.872
WAS
ORL
-0.049 -0.567
West Conference
OKC
Northwest Division
POR UTA DEN MIN OKC POR
t-statistics
UTA DEN MIN
OKC 0.002 -0.116 -0.072 -0.017 0.384 -1.196 -0.906 -0.378
POR
UTA
-0.045 -0.033
-0.320
-0.138
0.003
-0.817 -0.535
-2.585
-1.115
0.121
DEN -0.013 -0.228
MIN
Pacific Division t-statistics
GSW LAC SAC PHX LAL GSW LAC SAC PHX LAL
GSW
LAC
0.001 0.001
-0.034
-0.204
-0.007
-0.096
-0.050
0.225 0.036
-0.427
-1.387
-0.316
-0.675
-0.438
SAC -0.254 -0.125 -2.144 -1.338
PHX
LAL
-0.206 -1.037
Southwest Division t-statistics
SAS DAL MEM HOU NOP SAS DAL MEM HOU NOP
SAS
DAL
-0.140 -0.002
-0.006
-0.036
-0.155
-0.118
-0.141
-1.572 -0.098
-0.208
-0.655
-1.784
-1.100
-1.552
MEM
HOU
0.004 0.001
-0.199
0.160 0.140
-1.830
NOP
The t-statistics are computed using the Delta method.
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Table 11: Outcome Function Estimates
Team
Parameter Estimate
Exper. Fatigue σ2r Exper.
t-statistics
Fatigue σ2r
TOR 0.0000 0.0002 0.0007 0.4322 2.1627 60.0333
BOS 0.0002 0.0000 0.0007 1.9461 0.1305 61.5467
NYK 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 1.0801 1.5110 60.7783
BKN 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0007 0.7985 -1.3967 60.6300
PHI 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.7050 1.3797 64.2028
CLE -0.0002 0.0004 0.0007 -2.1448 3.9403 61.3677
IND 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.7459 0.8906 60.6465
DET -0.0001 0.0002 0.0007 -0.8755 2.6751 59.2284
CHI 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 0.7086 1.1942 59.8832
MIL 0.0001 0.0000 0.0006 1.4290 -0.3539 59.7662
MIA 0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 0.0699 1.2007 60.7783
ATL 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0007 2.9096 -0.7113 63.5767
CHA 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 0.2671 1.3312 59.0085
WAS 0.0000 0.0000 0.0007 -0.1675 0.4690 61.8708
ORL 0.0001 0.0000 0.0007 0.9473 -0.4786 60.2495
OKC -0.0001 0.0002 0.0007 -0.9113 2.2144 60.9426
POR 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.5428 1.0831 60.6465
UTA 0.0001 0.0003 0.0007 1.0949 2.9773 63.7966
DEN 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 1.4732 1.1264 60.7124
MIN 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 0.4925 1.4218 61.4980
GSW 0.0001 0.0000 0.0007 0.9787 0.4454 61.5142
LAC -0.0002 0.0003 0.0007 -2.0434 2.8251 61.0246
SAC 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 0.0606 0.8664 62.5620
PHX -0.0001 0.0000 0.0007 -1.0618 0.0162 60.3490
LAL 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 0.3291 1.5397 59.1946
SAS -0.0001 0.0002 0.0007 -0.6380 2.3176 61.2862
DAL 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0007 1.6625 -0.8558 62.7375
MEM 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 -0.4087 0.9881 60.9098
HOU 0.0000 0.0002 0.0007 0.5125 2.2838 62.6738
NOP 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 1.2368 1.7580 61.2372
Exper. is Experience.
Asymptotic standard errors and t-statistics.
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